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¶1 One of the fundamental questions facing American criminal courts is: what should 
be done with those persons who are legally competent to stand trial and who assert their 
constitutional right to represent themselves, but who have both a lack of legal knowledge 
and skill, and mental or emotional problems that limit their ability to represent 
themselves?  These are the so-called ―gray-area‖ defendants, a characterization coined by 
Justice Breyer in a recent majority opinion in Indiana v. Edwards.
1
   In Edwards, the 
Supreme Court held that in such circumstances a trial court has discretion to impose 
unwanted counsel on the defendant in order to ensure that the defendant does not make a 
―spectacle‖ of himself, thus fulfilling the court‘s duty to ensure a fair trial.2 
¶2 This decision is not unexpected, given the all-or-nothing model of representation 
present under current American law.  Our legal system fails to provide any alternative 
forms of representation to the two extremes of self-representation or representation by 
counsel.  In this context, the Supreme Court predictably gave greater weight to the state‘s 
interest in maintaining the appearance of a ―fair trial‖—understood as a matter of 
avoiding a ―spectacle‖—than the defendant‘s right to dignity and autonomy, which are 
fulfilled by permitting him to present his own defense without unwanted counsel.  In 
striking the balance that it did, the Court, I argue, improperly uses such defendants for its 
own ends of maintaining the courts‘ image of institutional legitimacy for the sake of the 
appearance rather than the reality of fairness.   
¶3 I argue that a different result would have been obtained if the American legal 
system recognized a variety of alternative methods of what is not really representation so 
much as assistance.  Such legal assistance methods are currently in use in Canadian 
courts, and others have previously met bench or bar resistance in the United States.  If 
adopted by American courts, these methods would provide assistance to ―gray-area‖ 
defendants short of full representation, and preserve the dignity and autonomy to which 
all persons are entitled under a system of equal justice.   
¶4 Which of the following three scenarios is best: (1) allowing  a ―gray-area‖ pro se 
defendant to flounder in making his or her defense without meaningful assistance; (2) 
forcing an unwanted attorney on such a defendant, resulting in the defendant‘s repeated 
objections and differences with counsel regarding the defense; or (3) adopting innovative 
court policies and practices that permit such defendants to have the assistance they need 
                                                 

 Associate Professor, Department of Criminal Justice, Loyola University Chicago.  J.D., DePaul 
University; Ph.D., Arizona State University.  I wish to thank Professor Vincent Samar of IIT-Chicago Kent 
College of Law for his valuable comments and guidance on this Article. 
1
 Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 172–173 (2008); see discussion infra Part V. 
2
 Id. at 176, 178. 
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to adequately present their defenses, short of full representation?  I argue that providing 
alternative methods of limited representation and assistance to ―gray-area‖ defendants 
would make the third option a reality.  Additionally, it would avoid what the Court in 
Edwards called the ―spectacle‖ of option 1, and also what I call the ―travesty of justice‖ 
of option 2, thus restoring the court‘s protection of the human dignity and autonomy 
interests previously recognized in Faretta v. California.
3
.  
¶5 Part I of this Article begins with a description of the facts and holding in Indiana v. 
Edwards.  This is followed by a description of the autonomy-fair trial debate engaged in 
by the majority and dissenters in Faretta, the decision first recognizing the constitutional 
right of self-representation.  The Court continued this same debate in Edwards.  This Part 
concludes with a review of the governing rules regarding self-representation which, on 
the one hand, require that pro se defendants follow the same procedural and substantive 
rules as represented parties, and on the other hand, preclude the court or any other person 
from assisting the defendant during the course of a trial. 
¶6 Part II of this Article begins with a discussion of the meaning of dignity, autonomy, 
and personhood before the law, terms repeatedly used by the Supreme Court as the 
foundation for the right of self-representation.  This Part reviews the history, meaning, 
evolution, and interchangeability of the terms.  A typology is then presented of the legal 
usage of these ideas in American, Canadian, and international law.   
¶7 In Part III, I argue that the state must do more than give lip service to the 
fundamental, individual interests in autonomy by recognizing them as they did in Faretta 
and its progeny.  The state must create conditions for fulfillment of the individual right of 
autonomy if that right is to have any salience in American law.  Here, I present the 
justification for such a duty and Supreme Court decisions bearing on the subject. 
¶8 Part IV presents a number of alternative forms of assistance and limited 
representation that may prove useful to American courts in addressing the ―gray-area‖ 
defendants.  Use of these methods will enable these defendants to present the defense of 
their choice in the manner they choose, thus maximizing their dignity and autonomy, 
while avoiding the unfairness of a spectacle that might otherwise result.  
¶9 I conclude with a call for adoption of these or other innovative forms of assistance 
to ―gray-area‖ defendants, and pro se litigants generally, to better protect the bedrock 
values of individual dignity and autonomy that are the foundation of any system of equal 
justice under law. 
                                                 
3
 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 832 (1975).  The Faretta Court noted that:  
In sum, there is no evidence that the colonists and the Framers ever doubted the right of 
self-representation, or imagined that this right might be considered inferior to the right of 
assistance of counsel.  To the contrary, the colonists and the Framers, as well as their 
English ancestors, always conceived of the right to counsel as an ‗assistance‘ for the 
accused, to be used at his option, in defending himself.  The Framers selected in the Sixth 
Amendment a form of words that necessarily implies the right of self-representation.  
That conclusion is supported by centuries of consistent history. 
Id.  
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II. INDIANA V. EDWARDS: PLACING LIMITS ON DIGNITY AND AUTONOMY 
A. Facts and Holding 
¶10 The U.S. Supreme Court recently addressed the question of whether a court may 
deny the right of self-representation and impose unwanted counsel on a criminal 
defendant who is competent to stand trial, but nevertheless has mental problems that may 
interfere with his ability to defend himself.
4
  In Indiana v. Edwards, the defendant was 
charged with attempted murder and other charges in connection with the shooting of a 
store security guard.
5




¶11 In the first competency hearing7 he was found unfit for trial.8 In the second, he was 
found competent to assist his attorneys in his defense and to stand trial, despite evidence 
establishing that he was suffering from mental illness.
9
  At a third pre-trial competency 
hearing, the court found that he was not then competent to stand trial.
10
  The evidence 
showed that he suffered from ―serious thinking difficulties and delusions,‖ and although 
the testifying psychiatrist indicated he could understand the charges against him, he also 




¶12 Eight months after his civil commitment, hospital authorities reported that Edwards 
was competent to stand trial, and about a year later, his trial was set.
12
  Shortly before 
trial, the defendant requested a continuance and the right to represent himself.  Both 
motions were denied.
13
  He proceeded to trial with court-appointed counsel and was 
found guilty of criminal recklessness and theft, but the jury failed to reach a verdict on 
the attempted murder charge.
14
  Before his second trial, Edwards renewed his request to 
self-represent.
15
  The trial judge denied the request again, finding that he still suffered 
from schizophrenia, saying that ―he‘s competent to stand trial, but I‘m not going to find 
he‘s competent to defend himself.‖16  Edwards was found guilty of the remaining counts, 




¶13 The Indiana Court of Appeals agreed with Edwards and reversed the trial court, a 
ruling thereafter affirmed by the Indiana Supreme Court based upon the Faretta and 
                                                 
4






 A competency hearing may be ordered ―If at any time before the final submission of any criminal case to 
the court or the jury trying the case, the court has reasonable grounds for believing that the defendant lacks 
the ability to understand the proceedings and assist in the preparation of a defense . . . .‖  IND. CODE § 35-
36-3-1(a) (2009). 
8
 Edwards, 554 U.S. at 167. 
9














 Id. at 169 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
17
 Id. 




  The United States Supreme Court vacated and remanded the 
decision of the Indiana Supreme Court for a new trial.
19
 
¶14 In its decision, the Court noted that the standards for competence to stand trial 
enunciated in Dusky v. United States
20
 and Drope v. Missouri
21
 did not consider ―the 
mental competency issue presented here, namely, the relation of the mental competence 
standard to the right of self-representation.‖22  The court went on to note, ―[A]n instance 
in which a defendant who would choose to forgo counsel at trial presents a very different 
set of circumstances, which in [the Court‘s] view calls for a different standard.‖23  The 
State argued that a Faretta hearing should be used ―to determine if the defendant has the 
minimal skills to communicate coherently with the court and the jury in a narrative 
fashion.‖24  The Supreme Court, however, held that the State may constitutionally limit a 
defendant‘s right of self-representation by insisting upon representation by counsel at 
trial ―on the ground that the defendant lacks the mental capacity to conduct his trial 
defense unless represented.‖25  This is because the Dusky and Drope standards assume 
representation by—and emphasize the importance of—counsel.26 
                                                 
18
 See infra Part II.B. 
19
 Edwards, 554 U.S. at 179.  
20
 Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam) (holding that competency to stand trial means 
that a defendant has ―sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of 
rational understanding‖ and a ―rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him‖). 
21
 See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 180–81 (1975) (defendants are presumed fit to stand trial unless a 
question regarding the defendant‘s competency arises before or during the trial). 
22
 Edwards, 554 U.S. at 170.  
23
 Id. at 174–175.  The court referred to sixteen state cases that it previously cited in Faretta for the 
proposition that there is an implicit competency limitation on the right of self-representation that arises 
where defendants are shown to be mentally defective.  Id. at 175.   
24
 Brief for Petitioner at 43 Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (2008) (No. 07-208), available at  
http://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/pdfs/07-08/07-208_Petitioner.pdf.   
25
 Edwards, 554 U.S. at 174. 
26
 The amicus brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers in Support of Neither Party 
suggested the Court should return to the common law competency standard which did not assume counsel 
would be available: 
 Unlike the Dusky standard, which inquires into defendant‘s ‗ability to consult with his lawyer‘ in 
order to ‗assist counsel,‘ . . .  the competency standard at common law focused entirely on 
defendant‘s capacity to present his own defense. It was long the rule at British common law that 
‗if, after he has pleaded, [a] prisoner becomes mad, he shall not be tried; for how can he make his 
defence?‘ . . .  As explained by New York‘s high court in 1847:  
 [T]he humanity of the law of England had prescribed that no man should be called 
upon to make his defense at a time when his mind was in such a situation that he 
appeared incapable of doing so; that however guilty he might be, the trial must be 
postponed to a time when, by collecting together his intellects, and having them 
entire, he should be able so to model his defense, if he had one, as to ward off the 
punishment of the law * * *.  
 Thus, as recounted by [the Supreme] Court: 
Beginning with the earliest cases, the issue at a sanity or competency hearing has 
been ‗whether the prisoner has sufficient understanding to comprehend the nature 
of this trial, so as to make a proper defence  to the charge.‘ 
Brief for. of Nat‘l Ass‘n of Criminal Def. Lawyers as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 7–8, 
Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (2008) (No. 07-208), available at  
http://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/pdfs/07-08/07-208_NeutralAmCuNACDL.pdf (citations 
omitted). 
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¶15 The majority also noted that mental illness varies in degree and over time, and 
interferes with an individual in different ways at different times.
27
  In some cases, a 
defendant may well be able to assist counsel in his defense, but ―may be unable to carry 
out the basic tasks needed to present his own defense without the help of counsel.‖28  The 
Court referred to mental conditions that fall ―in a gray area between Dusky’s minimal 
constitutional requirement that measures a defendant‘s ability to stand trial and a 
somewhat higher standard that measures mental fitness for another legal purpose,‖ 
referring to such defendants as ―gray-area defendants.‖29 
¶16 Finally, the Court held that the right of self-representation will not affirm the 
dignity of a defendant who lacks the mental capacity to conduct his own defense without 
the assistance of counsel.
30
  The Court found that fair trials trump autonomy and 
dignity.
31
  By doing so, the Court elevated the trial court‘s institutional legitimacy over 
the dignity and autonomy of the defendant.
32
  This is not the first time that the Court 
sought to balance autonomy and the judicial duty to ensure fairness. 
B. The Autonomy-Fair Trial Debate 
¶17 In Faretta, the dissenters voiced concern over the potentially harsh results of 
recognizing a constitutional right to self-representation in criminal cases.  Chief Justice 
Burger, joined by Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist, argued that judicial discretion and 
state law—not the Constitution—should determine whether and under what 
circumstances self-representation should be permitted.
33
  He saw ―nothing desirable or 
useful in permitting every accused‖ to conduct his own criminal defense, predicting that 
to do so will in almost all cases result in the defendant losing whatever defense he may 
have had.
34




¶18 Justice Blackmun, dissenting separately, and joined by Chief Justice Burger and 
Justice Rehnquist, wrote that he not only could find ―no textual support for this 
conclusion [of a constitutional right of self-representation] in the language of the Sixth 
Amendment,‖ but that the right would breach the state‘s interest in a criminal prosecution 
―‗. . . not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done‘ . . . I do not believe that 
any amount of pro se pleading can cure the injury to society of an unjust result.‖36  He 
                                                 
27
 Edwards, 554 U.S. at 175. 
28
 Id. at 175–76.   
29
 Id. at 172–73.   
30
 Id. at 176.  
31
 Id. at 176–77. 
32
 The Court specifically noted its concern about the ―appearance‖ of fairness to all who might observe the 
proceedings were Edwards  permitted to represent himself: 
 [P]roceedings must not only be fair, they must ‗appear fair to all who observe them.‘ An 
amicus brief reports one psychiatrist's reaction to having observed a patient (a patient 
who had satisfied Dusky) try to conduct his own defense: ‗[H]ow in the world can our 
legal system allow an insane man to defend himself?‘ 
Id. at 177 (citations omitted).  
33
 Faretta, 422 U.S. at 840 (Burger, J., dissenting). 
34
 Id. at 836. 
35
 Id. at 839–40.   
36
 Id. at 846–49 (citations omitted).  Justice Blackmun makes the not uncommon mistake of equating self-
representation with frivolousness: ―I cannot agree that there is anything in the Due Process Clause or the 
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prophetically identified the key procedural problem that would arise from the majority‘s 
opinion: ―Must the trial court treat the pro se defendant differently than it would 
professional counsel?‖37  Justice Blackmun ended his dissent: ―If there is any truth to the 
old proverb that ‗one who is his own lawyer has a fool for a client,‘ the Court by its 
opinion today now bestows a constitutional right on one to make a fool of himself.‖38      
¶19 The issue arose again in Godinez v. Moran,39 where the Court upheld a guilty plea 
of a ―gray area‖ defendant.40  In Godinez v. Moran, the Supreme Court addressed the 
question of whether the test for competence to stand trial, in other words, whether the 
defendant has a ―rational understanding‖41 of the proceedings, includes a capacity for 
―reasoned choice‖ among the alternatives available to him.42  The trial court had found 
that defendant Moran was competent to stand trial, and that he had knowingly, 
voluntarily, and intelligently waived his rights to counsel and trial.  The court, thereupon, 
accepted his guilty plea.  Moran subsequently filed an unsuccessful state post-conviction 
petition and an appeal to the state supreme court, claiming the trial judged erred by 
                                                                                                                                                 
Sixth Amendment that requires the States to subordinate the solemn business of conducting a criminal 
prosecution to the whimsical–albeit voluntary–caprice of every accused who wishes to use his trial as a 
vehicle for personal or political self-gratification.‖  Id. at 849.  Faretta was decided in 1975, not long after 
courts had experienced defendants, such as the ―Chicago Eight,‖ who used their trials as anti-war political 
platforms, some of which became disruptive.  See Joel M. Flaum & James R. Thompson, The Case of the 
Disruptive Defendant: Illinois v. Allen, 61 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 327 (1970) (discussing 
when a disruptive defendant does not have a right to be present at the trial).  In 1970, Time reported that 
one bar committee ―is investigating the use of glass isolation booths in which a defendant can hear the 
proceedings but not be heard himself. . . .  [as] was employed in the 1961 trial of Adolph Eichman.‖  The 
Law: How to Control the Court, TIME, March 9, 1970, available at  
http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,878786,00.html. 
37
 Faretta, 422 U.S. at 852.  
38
 Id.  
39
 Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993). 
40
 Mental condition is obviously not the only factor affecting a defendant‘s capability of self-representation.  
One would think that, given the labyrinth of procedural and evidentiary rules in any litigation, and given 
the government‘s interest in assuring a fair trial, that there would be some minimum standard by which 
courts should measure a party‘s capacity to self-represent.  As the U.S. Supreme Court once stated in Wade 
v. Mayo, a case involving an eighteen year old burglary defendant who was forced to represent himself 
when his motion for counsel was denied:  
 [T]hough not wholly a stranger to the Court Room, having been convicted of prior 
offenses, [the defendant] was still an inexperienced youth unfamiliar with Court 
procedure, and not capable of adequately representing himself. 
. . . . 
There are some individuals who, by reason of age, ignorance or mental capacity, 
are incapable of representing themselves adequately in a prosecution of a relatively 
simple nature.  This incapacity is purely personal and can be determined only by an 
examination and observation of the individual.  Where such incapacity is present, the 
refusal to appoint counsel is a denial of due process of law under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
334 U.S. 672, 683–84 (1948).  In Wade v. Mayo, a case decided fifteen years before the Supreme Court 
recognized a right to counsel in criminal cases in Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), the Court 
recognized that factors other than mental capacity could constitute barriers to due process for a pro se 
defendant, justifying innovative methods of pro se assistance as I propose here. 
41
 Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per curiam).   
42
 Godinez, 509 U.S. at 397.  The Court noted a split in the circuits and among state supreme courts on the 
issue of whether the competency standard for pleading guilty or waiving the right to counsel is higher than 
the competency standard for standing trial.  Id. at 395 n.5.   
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failing to conduct a competency hearing regarding his mental incompetency to represent 
himself.
43
  His federal habeas petition was also denied, but the Ninth Circuit reversed.
44
 
¶20 The Court of Appeals held that the District Court erred in not determining that the 
defendant was ―mentally capable of the reasoned choice required for a valid waiver of 
constitutional rights.‖45  The Ninth Circuit relied on facts showing the defendant had 
attempted suicide, had desired to discharge his attorney so as to prevent the introduction 
of mitigating evidence at sentencing, had responded with monosyllabic answers to the 
court‘s questions, and was on medication at the time he sought to waive his right to 
counsel and plead guilty.
46
 
¶21 In reversing the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court noted that it had ―never 
expressly articulated a standard for competence to plead guilty or to waive the right to the 
assistance of counsel.‖47  The Court first questioned whether there was any real 
difference between the ―reasoned choice‖ standard and the ―rational understanding‖ of 
the proceedings standard.
48
  The Court then held that even if there was, ―we reject the 
notion that competence to plead guilty or to waive the right to counsel must be measured 
by a standard that is higher than (or even different from) the Dusky standard.‖49  The 
Court noted that while defendants who stand trial and defendants who plead guilty make 
important decisions after charges are brought, there was no basis for demanding a higher 
level of competence for those who choose to plead guilty.
50
 
¶22 In ruling that the standard is the same for permitting pro se defendants either to 
plead guilty or to go to trial, the Court first recalled the language in Faretta to the effect 
that judges must make sure the defendant requesting to self-represent must do so 
―competently and intelligently.‖51  ―Technical legal knowledge‖ was said to be ―not 
relevant‖ to the issue of competence to waive the right to counsel.52   
¶23 Then, the Court returned to the autonomy rationale of Faretta, where it 
―emphasized that although the defendant ‗may conduct his own defense ultimately to his 
own detriment, his choice must be honored.‘‖53  The Court added that, in addition to 
determining whether a defendant is fit to stand trial, courts must also determine that the 
waiver of constitutional rights (i.e. rights to counsel, trial, privilege against self-
incrimination, and confrontation of accusers) is knowing and voluntary: ―In this sense 
there is a ‗heightened‘ standard for pleading guilty and for waiving the right to counsel, 
but it is not a heightened standard of competence.‖54  In other words, more constitutional 
                                                 
43




 Id. at 394 (quoting Moran v. Godinez, 972 F.2d 263, 267 (9th Cir. 1992), rev’d, 509 U.S. 389 (1993)). 
46
 Moran, 972 F.2d at 265.  
47
 Godinez, 509 U.S. at 396. 
48
 Id. at 397–98. 
49
 Id. at 398. 
50
 Id. at 399. 
51
 Id. at 399–400. 
52
 Id.   
53
 Id. at 399–400 (quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975)).  The Court stated, that ―while 
‗[i]t is undeniable that in most criminal prosecutions defendants could better defend with counsel's 
guidance than by their own unskilled efforts,‘ . . . a criminal defendant's ability to represent himself has no 
bearing upon his competence to choose self-representation.‖  Id.  (citation omitted). 
54
 Id. at 400–01; see Shafer v. Bowersox, 329 F.3d 637, 650 (8th Cir. 2003) (―The [State] supreme court 
declined to consider evidence of Shafer's mental condition before concluding that his waivers and pleas had 
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rights available at trial are being lost as a consequence of a waiver of the right to trial 
(through a guilty plea) than when the defendant requests to proceed to trial pro se, and 
only loses the right to assistance of counsel.   
¶24 Joined by Justice Stevens, Justice Blackmun dissented, arguing that prior cases had 
indeed noted that competency must be determined in the context of the nature of the 
proceedings, which would include the defendant‘s personal competence (or capacity) for 
self-representation.
55
  Their concern was the fact that the defendant in Godinez 
discharged counsel for the purpose of proceeding pro se, so that the existing test for 
competency—measured by a defendant‘s ability to consult with counsel and assist in 
preparing his defense, under Dusky—was neither relevant nor reliable:   
The question is no longer whether the defendant can proceed with an 
attorney, but whether he can proceed alone and uncounseled.  I do not 
believe we place an excessive burden upon a trial court requiring it to 
conduct a specific inquiry into that at the juncture when a defendant whose 
competency already has been questioned seeks to waive counsel and 
represent himself.
56
   
¶25 Justice Blackmun went on to criticize the majority‘s reliance upon Faretta by first 
pointing out the difference in the characteristics of the defendants in Faretta and 
Godinez.  In the former, the defendant was ―literate, competent, and understanding‖ and 
the record showed ―he was voluntarily exercising his informed free will.‖57  In contrast, 
in Godinez, the trial court had ―grave doubts‖ regarding defendant Moran‘s ―ability to 
discharge counsel and represent himself.‖58 A defendant ―who is utterly incapable of 
conducting his own defense cannot be considered to be ‗competent‘ to make such a 
                                                                                                                                                 
been knowing, voluntary, and intelligent because it believed that reference to that condition was 
‗tantamount to a claim that he was not competent to waive counsel.‘‖) (citation omitted).  The Godinez 
Court also noted that, ―[w]hile psychiatrists and scholars may find it useful to classify the various kinds and 
degrees of competence, and while States are free to adopt competency standards that are more elaborate 
than the Dusky formulation, the Due Process Clause does not impose these additional requirements.‖  
Godinez, 509 U.S. at 402; see Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 446–53 (1992) (state‘s allocation of 
burden of proof to defendant and requiring that unfitness be established by a preponderance of the evidence 
was held not to violate Due Process Clause).  
55
 Godinez, 509 U.S. at 413.  See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 176 (1975) (―[A] defendant‘s mental 
condition may be relevant to more than one legal issue, each governed by distinct rules reflecting quite 
different policies.‖); Rees v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312, 314 (1966) (stating trial court should ―determine 
[petitioner‘s] mental competence in the present posture of things‖); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 
(1972) (holding that the ―person charged by a State with criminal offense who is committed solely on 
account of their incapacity to proceed to trial cannot be held more than the reasonable period of time 
necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that they will attain that capacity in the 
foreseeable future‖). 
56
 Godinez, 509 U.S. at 413.  ―[T]he majority cannot isolate the term ‗competent‘ and apply it in a vacuum, 
divorced from its specific context.  A person who is ‗competent‘ to play basketball is not thereby 
‗competent‘ to play the violin.  The majority‘s monolithic approach to competency is true to neither life nor 
the law.  Competency for one purpose does not necessarily translate to competency for another purpose.‖  
Id. (emphasis added).   
57
 Id. at 416 (quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975)). 
58
 Id.  
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decision, any more than a person who chooses to leap out of a window in the belief that 
he can fly can be considered ‗competent‘ to make such a choice.‖59 
¶26 Justice Blackmun‘s dissent concludes with the following declaration: 
To try, convict, and punish one so helpless to defend himself contravenes 
fundamental principles of fairness and impugns the integrity of our 
criminal justice system.  I cannot condone the decision to accept, without 
further inquiry, the self-destructive ―choice‖ of a person who was so 
deeply medicated and who might well have been mentally ill.  I dissent.
60
 
¶27 Thus, in both Faretta and Godinez, the majority found that the defendants‘ 
autonomy and dignity was inherent in the right to self-representation and trumped the 
state‘s interest in ensuring what it considered a fair trial.  This position was then reversed 
in Indiana v. Edwards.  The majority in Edwards in effect adopted Justice Burger‘s 
dissenting opinion in Faretta, in which Justice Burger had warned that recognizing a 
constitutional right to self-representation could result in individuals with various levels of 
incompetence (however defined) making a spectacle of themselves and giving the 
proceedings an appearance of unfairness.
61
  The Edwards court concluded that a state 
may insist upon representation by counsel for those competent to stand trial under Dusky, 
―but who still suffer from severe mental illness to the point where they are not competent 
to conduct trial proceedings by themselves.‖62   
                                                 
59
 Id.  The dissenters pointed to the fact that Moran had attempted suicide after his arrest.  He was being 
administered four different prescription medications with their accompanying side effects when he made 
the decision to plead guilty and waive submission of evidence in mitigation.  Id. at 416–17.  By doing so, 
he ―essentially volunteered himself for execution.‖  Id. at 417.  Justice Blackmun found that, ―Upon this 
evidence, there can be no doubt that the trial judge should have conducted another competency evaluation 
to determine Moran‘s capacity to waive the right to counsel and represent himself, instead of relying upon 
the psychiatrists‘ reports that he was able to stand trial with the assistance of counsel.‖  Id. at 417; see 
Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 142, (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (―[Drugs may] compromise the 
right of a medicated criminal defendant to receive a fair trial . . . by rendering him unable or unwilling to 
assist counsel.‖).   
60
 Id. at 417.  Following the majority opinion in Godinez, but before the 2008 decision in Indiana v. 
Edwards, state and federal courts considered a number of cases involving competent pro se defendants with 
varying mental conditions and abilities, not all of which necessitated imposition of unwanted counsel.  See, 
e.g., People v. Redd, where the Illinois Supreme Court stated: 
 We also reject defendant‘s allegation that the numerous rambling motions he filed during 
the three year pretrial period should have caused the court to question his mental 
competency to waive counsel.  Our review of the record indicates that defendant‘s 
motions arguably exhibit a lack of comprehensive knowledge of the law and principles of 
criminal procedure.  Nonetheless, neither the written motions nor the record of 
defendant‘s defense of the motions demonstrates irrationality.  Defendant‘s ability to 
articulate his case and to precisely motion the court are merely measures of his 
proficiency or lack thereof as a lawyer.  His ability to represent himself is not indicative 
of his competence to choose self-representation. 
670 N.E.2d 583, 594 (Ill. 1996). 
61
 Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 176–77 (2008).   
62
 Id. at 178.  One commentator notes that the Supreme Court in Edwards failed to establish any standards 
to guide judges in future cases, thus making the matter solely one of judicial discretion.  Alexander B. 
Feinberg, Casenote: Constitutional Law—Competency and Self-representation—Constitution Permits 
States to Limit a Defendant’s Self-representation Right by Insisting Upon Representation by Counsel for 
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¶28 The Court made two additional important rulings in Edwards.  First, it expressly 
rejected as the standard for competence to proceed pro se proposed by the State of 
Indiana.  Indiana‘s proposal was that there be no right to self-representation where a 
defendant ―cannot communicate coherently with the court or a jury.‖63  The majority was 
―sufficiently uncertain‖ as to how that standard would work in practice.64   
¶29 Second, the Court rejected the State‘s call for a reversal of Faretta: 
We recognize that judges have sometimes expressed concern that Faretta, 
contrary to its intent, has led to trials that are unfair. . . .  But recent 
empirical research suggests that such instances are not common. . . .  
[I]nstances in which the trial‘s fairness is in doubt may well be 
concentrated in the 20 percent or so of self-representation cases where the 
mental competence of the defendant is also at issue. . . . If so, today‘s 
opinion, assuring trial judges the authority to deal appropriately with cases 
in the latter category, may well alleviate those fair trial concerns.
65
 
¶30 Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, dissented.  After citing Faretta and 
Godinez, Scalia wrote: 
The Court today concludes that a state may nonetheless strip a mentally ill 
defendant of the right to represent himself when that would be fairer.  In 
my view, the Constitution does not permit a State to substitute its own 
perception of fairness for the defendant‘s right to make his own case 




¶31 Scalia noted that defendant Edwards‘ condition had fluctuated over the years, 
sometimes improving with antipsychotic medication, during which times he was found 
competent to stand trial.
67
  While he filed certain incoherent pleadings, others that he 
filed were quite intelligible; also, his courtroom arguments were more intelligible than his 
written pleadings.
68
  Before his first trial, Edwards also answered most of the trial judge‘s 
questioning about state law and trial procedures when the judge was considering his first 
                                                                                                                                                 
Defendant Lacking Mental Competency, Indiana v. Edwards, 128 S. Ct. 2379 (2008), 39. CUMB. L. REV. 
567, 579 (2009).    
63
 Edwards, 554 U.S. at 178.  Interestingly, during oral argument, Justice Scalia added some levity and 
generated laughter by pointing out that, ―I sometimes think that the lawyers cannot communicate 
coherently.‖  Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, Indiana v. Edwards, 554  U.S. 164 (2008) (No. 07-208), 
available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/07-208.pdf; Oral 
Argument, Indiana v. Edwards, 554  U.S. 164 (2008) (No. 07-208), available at  
http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2007/2007_07_208.   
64
 Edwards, 554 U.S. at 178. 
65
 Id. at 178–79 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).  Scalia cites Professor Hashimoto, who notes that 0.3-
0.5 percent of all state felony defendants who chose to self-represent achieved a higher acquittal rate than 
their represented counterparts.  Id. at 178 (citing Erica Hashimoto, Defending the Right of Self-
Representation: An Empirical Look at the Pro se Felony Defendant, 85 N.C. L. REV. 423 (2007).  
66




 Id. at 181.  





  The request was denied ―because Edwards acknowledged he would 
need a continuance.‖70  The trial judge again denied his request to proceed pro se before 
his second trial, this time because Edwards was not competent to represent himself, 
without explaining precisely what abilities Edwards lacked.
71
 
¶32 Scalia reviewed the multiple rationales of Faretta, i.e., the long history of the right 
of self-representation, the basic principle that counsel cannot under our system of justice 
be forced upon a defendant, and the principle that courts must honor an individual‘s 
choice of self-representation as a matter of ―respect for the individual which is the 
lifeblood of the law.‖72  He reminded the majority that Godinez was decided in part on its 
acknowledgement in Faretta that the Sixth Amendment protected the defendant‘s right 
―to conduct a defense to his disadvantage.‖73 
¶33 Scalia argued that a State‘s view of fairness or other values does not permit it to 
strip a defendant‘s constitutional right to self-representation.74  The question, he noted, is 
not whether one constitutional right must yield to another in case of conflict.
75
  While the 
purpose of the Sixth Amendment is to ensure a fair trial, it does not follow that 
constitutional rights can be disregarded as ―long as the trial is, on the whole, fair.‖76  
Scalia reminded the majority that the ―dignity‖ of the individual Faretta intended to 
protect ―is not the defendant‘s making a fool of himself by presenting an amateurish or 
even incoherent defense.  Rather, the dignity at issue is the supreme human dignity of 
being master of one‘s fate rather than a ward of the State—the dignity of individual 
choice.‖77  He cited language in McKaskle v. Wiggins to the effect that a pro se defendant 
―must be allowed to control the organization and content of his own defense, to make 
                                                 
69




 Id. at 181–82. 
72
 Id. at 182–83 (quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975)).  Scalia remarked that: 
What the Constitution requires is not that a State‘s case be subject to the most rigorous 
adversarial testing possible—after all, it permits a defendant to eliminate all adversarial 
testing by pleading guilty.  What the Constitution requires is that a defendant be given the 
right to challenge the State‘s case against him using the arguments he sees fit.   
Id. at 184. 
73
 Id. at 184 (citing Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 399–400 (1993)). 
74
 Id. at 185. 
75
 Id. at 184–85. 
76
 Id. at 185 (citing United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 145 (2006) (where defendant was 
denied counsel of his choice, his Sixth Amendment right was violated)); see Crawford v. Washington, 541 
U.S. 36 (2004) (states may not provide for unconfronted testimony to be used at trial so long as it is 
reliable).  At oral argument, Scalia addressed the claim that observers of a pro se mentally-ill defendant‘s 
trial would not see it as being fair by stating: 
 How fair does a trial seem to the public where the defendant stands up and says, Your 
Honor, I want to represent myself?  I do not want this attorney.  I want to defend myself.  
And the judge said, sit down, we have a psychological evaluation of you.  You can‘t 
represent yourself.  How fair does that seem to the public? 
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 63, at 57–58. 
  Justice Scalia noted that the only ground upon which constitutional trial rights have been limited 
in the past is the case of disruptive defendants, which was not relevant to Edwards because he ―was not 
even allowed to begin to represent himself, and because he was respectful and compliant and did not 
provide a basis to conclude a trial could not have gone forward had he been allowed to press his own 
claims.‖  Edwards, 554 U.S. at 185–86. 
77
 Edwards, 554 U.S. at 186–87 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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motions, to argue points of law, to participate in voir dire, to question witnesses, and to 
address the court and the jury at appropriate points in the trial.‖ 78      
¶34 Justice Scalia further noted that, while the right of self-representation is not 
expressly contained in the Constitution, it provides the defendant—not his attorney—the 
right to call witnesses, the right to confront witnesses against him, and the right to the 
assistance of counsel in ―his defence.‖79  Here, Edwards wanted to present a defense of 
self-defense, while his attorney wanted to present a defense focusing on lack of intent.  
For the State to deprive him of his right to make his own defense simply because his 
court-appointed attorney makes a different legal argument is, quoting Justice Frankfurter, 
to ―imprison a man in his privileges and call it the Constitution.‖80   
¶35 Continuing his attack on the majority‘s opinion, Scalia challenged the notion that 
the public‘s perception of fairness should trump the defendant‘s choice to represent 
himself: 
A further purpose that the Court finds is advanced by denial of the right of 
self-representation is the purpose of assuring that trials ‗appear fair to all 
who observe them.‘ . . .  To my knowledge we have never denied a 
defendant a right simply on the ground that it would make his trial appear 
less ‗fair‘ to outside observers, and I would not inaugurate that principle 
here.  But were I to do so, I would not apply it to deny a defendant the 
right to represent himself when he knowingly and voluntarily waives 
counsel.  When Edwards stood to say that ‗I have a defense that I would 
like to represent or present to the Judge,‘ . . . it seems to me the epitome of 
both actual and apparent unfairness for the judge to say, I have heard ‗your 
desire to proceed by yourself and I've denied your request, so your 
attorney will speak for you from now on.‘81  
¶36 Lastly, Justice Scalia concluded by calling the majority‘s decision ―extraordinarily 
vague‖ insofar as it permits a lack of mental competence under some circumstances to 
form a basis for denial of the right of self-representation: ―[T]he indeterminacy makes a 
bad holding worse.  Once the right of self-representation for the mentally ill is a 
sometime thing, trial judges will have every incentive to make their lives easier—to avoid 
the painful necessity of deciphering occasional pleadings . . . —by appointing 
knowledgeable and literate counsel.‖82 
¶37 Significantly, one of Justice Scalia‘s comments during oral argument in Edwards 
addressed the implications of the State of Indiana‘s argument that if the State can deprive 
mentally ill persons of their right of self-representation because of their inability to 
represent themselves, then the same can be said of most pro se defendants: 
But surely his total ignorance of all the trial rules, the hearsay rule and the 
other details of conducting a trial, is a great disadvantage.  But we allow 
him to toss that away so long as he knows he‘s tossing it away. . . .  
                                                 
78
 Id. at 186 (citing McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 174 (1984)). 
79
 Id. at 188 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VI). 
80
 Id. at 189 (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 280 (1942)). 
81
 Id. at 187–88. 
82
 Id. at 189. 
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Why can‘t we say the same thing about his supposed inability to 
communicate effectively, unless and until he turns the trial into a farce?
83
 
¶38 To summarize, the dissenters in Faretta, in opposing recognition of the 
constitutional right to self-representation, invoked (1) the potential harm to the integrity 
of the justice system; (2) the loss of public confidence in the courts from unjust results 
that might obtain; and (3) the state‘s obligation to produce results that are just and appear 
so.  In Godinez, the dissenters, in arguing that gray-area defendants should not be 
permitted to plead guilty pro se, argued that allowing them to do so contravenes the 
―fundamental principles of fairness‖ and ―impugns the integrity of our criminal justice 
system.‖  These views recently became those of the majority in Edwards, which justified 
its denial of the right to self-representation for mentally challenged defendants on the 
same rationales: (1) the potential ―spectacle‖ of a ―gray area‖ defendant defending 
himself; (2) the potential of improper convictions; and (3) the importance of the state‘s 
interest in providing a trial that is fair in both appearance and in fact.  Justice Scalia, 
joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, staunchly advocated for the rights of mentally 
challenged pro se defendants.  They argued that personal dignity and autonomy trump the 
state‘s interests in ensuring a fair trial and preserving the court‘s legitimacy. 
C. The American Same-Rules and No-Assistance Doctrines 
¶39 Individuals without training face significant obstacles to successfully navigating the 
American legal system. No one disagrees that the system is difficult to navigate, even for 
attorneys. But the barriers facing gray-area defendants, like other pro se litigants, go 
beyond lack of legal knowledge and skill.  Two additional barriers were created by the 
U.S. Supreme Court.  While the Court is commonly viewed as a court of last resort, 
correcting injustices of the legal system and promoting access to justice, it also 
established the two greatest access-to-justice barriers for pro se defendants: the same-
rules and the no-assistance doctrines.   
¶40 The U.S. Supreme Court's 1975 decision in Faretta v. California is the source of 
the same-rules doctrine.  The Court noted that the right to self-representation did not 
mean a pro se defendant would be allowed to disrupt the court, nor did it provide ―a 
license not to comply with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.‖84  The latter 
statement, as well as the Court‘s holding that the defendant‘s ―technical legal knowledge‖ 
was not relevant to his knowing exercise of the right,
85
 signaled that courts could hold 
pro se litigants to the same laws, rules, and practice standards as attorneys (the same-
rules doctrine). 
                                                 
83
 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 63, at 10–11. 
84
 Faretta v. California¸ 422 U.S. 806, 834 n.46 (1975).  Interestingly, the majority uses dignity in two 
senses on the same page: (1) dignity in the older usage of the social rank or importance of the court as an 
institution, i.e., the ―dignity of the courtroom,‖ and (2) in the sense of the right of persons before the court 
to the individual dignity that is at the foundation of the right to self-representation, i.e., ―‗that respect for 
the individual which is the lifeblood of the law‘‖ Id. at 834 n.46 (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 
350–51 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)); see discussion infra Part III.A.   
85
 Id. at 836. 
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¶41 Thereafter, in McNeil v. United States,86 the Court extended the same-rules doctrine 
to civil cases.  The Court affirmed the dismissal of a prisoner‘s civil action under the 
Federal Tort Claims Act for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, where he had first 
filed suit, and four months later initiated the required administrative remedy.
87
  The Court 
proclaimed it had ―never suggested that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation 
should be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel.‖88 
¶42 Then, in McKaskle v. Wiggins,89 the Court upheld a trial judge‘s power to impose 
standby counsel to assist the pro se defendant in a robbery case.
90
  The Court reiterated 
the same-rules doctrine first announced in Faretta and held that ―[a] defendant does not 
have a constitutional right to receive personal instruction from the trial judge on 
courtroom procedure.  Nor does the Constitution require judges to take over chores for a 
pro se defendant that would normally be attended to by trained counsel as a matter of 
course.‖91   
¶43 The aforementioned precedents, which make no distinction between civil and 
criminal cases, form the basis of numerous state and federal court decisions holding pro 
se defendants to the same laws and rules that must be followed by attorneys,
92
 and 
refusing to provide them with judicial assistance.
93
  Liberality and solicitude, however, 
                                                 
86
 McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106 (1993). 
87
 Id. at 108. 
88
 Id. at 113; see Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 826 (1980) (affirming a district court‘s dismissal 
of a race discrimination complaint because of a late filing of an EEOC charge which was a prerequisite to 
the suit).  
89
 McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984). 
90
 Id. at 176. 
91
 Id. at 183–84. 
92
 Many federal decisions uphold the same-rules doctrine.  See, e.g., Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & 
Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005) (―[T]his court has repeatedly insisted that pro se parties follow 
the same rules of procedure that govern other litigants.‖);  United States v. Merrill, 746 F.2d 458, 465 (9th 
Cir. 1984) (―A pro se defendant is subject to the same rules of procedure and evidence as defendants who 
are represented by counsel.‖);  Birl v. Estelle, 660 F.2d 592, 593 (5th Cir.1981) (―The right of self-
representation does not exempt a party from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive 
law.‖). 
Many state cases uphold the same-rules doctrine.  See, e.g., People v. Romero, 694 P.2d 1256, 
1266 (Colo. 1985) (―By electing to represent himself the defendant subjected himself to the same rules, 
procedures, and substantive law applicable to a licensed attorney.‖); Grandison v. State, 670 A.2d 398, 408 
(Md. 1995) (―We note preliminarily that we have long held that a defendant in a criminal case who chooses 
to represent himself is subject to the same rules regarding reviewability and waiver of questions not raised 
at trial as one who is represented by counsel.‖); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 555 A.2d 846, 852 (Pa. 
1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881 (1990) (noting that a pro se defendant ―subject to the same rules of 
procedure as is a counseled defendant"). 
93
 Martinez v. Court of Appeal of California, 528 U.S. 152, 162 (2000) (―[T]he trial judge is under no duty 
to provide personal instruction on courtroom procedure or to perform any legal 'chores' for the defendant 
that counsel would normally carry out.‖); Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004) (―[D]istrict judges have 
no obligation to act as counsel or paralegal to pro se litigants.‖); United States v. Turner, 287 F.3d 980, 984 
(10th Cir. 2002) (noting that the trial court ―explained to Mr. Turner that he would be required to follow 
court rules without any assistance from the judge. We are satisfied that the district court provided Mr. 
Turner with enough information to make an informed, knowing, and thus legally intelligent decision 
whether to waive his right to counsel.‖); United States v. Hayes, 231 F.3d 1132, 1139 n.4 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(―[T]he defendant will have to abide by the same rules as lawyers and will get no assistance from the judge 
. . . .‖) (quoting CALIFORNIA JUDGES BENCHBOOK: CRIMINAL PRETRIAL PROCEEDINGS (1991)).  
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are sometimes required when considering the merits of pro se pleadings
94
 and in 
overlooking some technical defaults in areas of civil procedural complexity.
95
  Judges 
may ethically provide ―reasonable accommodations‖ to pro se defendants (or pro se 
litigants, generally) at their discretion.
96
  And, while some decisions establish a few 
limited, affirmative judicial duties to assist, such as providing civil pro se litigants ―fair 
notice‖ of the complex rules for summary judgment,97 and identifying and assisting in 
service of summons upon the proper adverse parties,
98
 no court has recognized a general 
judicial duty of assistance to pro se defendants or litigants.
99
 
                                                 
94
 See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (―[W]e hold [pro se pleadings] to less stringent standards 
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers . . . .‖).    
95
 See, e.g., Breck v. Ulmer, 745 P.2d 66, 75 (Alaska 1987) (―[T]he trial judge should inform a pro se 
litigant of the proper procedure for the action he or she is obviously attempting to accomplish . . . .‖); 
Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1213 (Utah 1983) (noting that pro se litigant ―should be accorded every 
consideration that may reasonably be indulged‖) (quoting Heathman v. Hatch, 372 P.2d , 990, 991 (1962)); 
Brooks v. Tradesmen Int‘l, Inc., 883 So. 2d 444, 447 (La. Ct. App. 2004) (noting that pro se workers‘ 
compensation claimant ―should be allotted more latitude than those plaintiffs represented by counsel‖); 
City of New Haven v. Bonner, 863 A.2d 680, 685 (Conn. 2005) ("‗[I]t is the established policy of the 
Connecticut courts to be solicitous of pro se litigants and when it does not interfere with the rights of other 
parties to construe the rules of practice liberally in favor of the pro se party.‘‖) (quoting Vanguard 
Engineering, Inc. v. Anderson, 848 A.2d 545, 548 (2004)). 
96
 See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, R. 2.2, cmt. 4 (2007), available at  
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/judicialethics/ABA_MCJC_approved.authcheckda
m.pdf ("[I]t is not a violation of this Rule [requiring judges to act ―fairly and impartially‖] for a judge to 
make reasonable accommodations to ensure pro se litigants the opportunity to have their matters fairly 
heard.").  Only one reported judicial ethics opinion authorizes judicial assistance, albeit in default cases 
only.  The Indiana Commission on Judicial Qualifications states in an ethics opinion that: 
 [N]ormally a judge should not ―try a case‖ for a litigant who is wholly failing to accomplish the 
task.  However, on the occasion where a[n] [unrepresented] citizen has the simplest kind of matter 
[e.g., uncontested divorce, name change petition] to bring before the court, with no adversarial 
context, and no indication of any untoward motive or disrespect for the court, the judge has a duty 
and responsibility to not simply turn that citizen away on the basis of a minor failure to establish 
every pertinent detail.  A judge‘s ethical obligation to treat all litigants fairly obligates the judge to 
ensure that a pro se litigant in a non-adversarial setting is not denied the relief sought only on the 
basis of minor or easily established deficiency in the litigant‘s presentation or pleadings. 
Indiana Commission on Judicial Qualifications, Adv. Op. 1-97, available at  
http://www.in.gov/judiciary/jud-qual/opinions.html (follow ―1-97‖ hyperlink). 
97
 See Joseph M. McLaughlin, Note, An Extension of the Right of Access: The Pro Se Litigant's Right to 
Notification of the Requirements of the Summary Judgment Rule, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 1109 (1987).  At 
least six of the twelve federal circuits require the trial judge to provide pro se litigants with some form of 
fair notice of Rule 56 requirements.  See Rand v. Rowland, 154 F. 3d 952, 960–61 (9th Cir. 1998) (en 
banc); Graham v. Lewinski, 848 F. 2d 342, 344 (2d Cir. 1988); Klingele v. Elkenberry, 849 F.2d 409, 411 
(9th Cir. 1988); United States v. One Colt Python .357 Caliber Revolver, 845 F.2d 287, 289 (11th Cir. 
1988); Jaxon v. Circle K Corp., 773 F.2d 1138, 1140 (10th Cir. 1985); Lewis v. Faulkner, 689 F.2d 100, 
102 (7th Cir. 1982); Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309, 310 (4th Cir. 1975). But see McDaniels v. 
McKinna, 96 Fed. Appx. 575, 578 (10th Cir. 2004) (―There is no such requirement in this Circuit. While 
we construe pleadings filed by a pro se litigant liberally, the courts do not serve as the pro se litigant's 
advocate, and pro se litigants are expected to follow the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as all litigants 
must.‖).  No such ―fair notice‖ rule has been generally adopted by state courts.   
98
 See, e.g., Pettus v. Deputy Bartlett, No. 04-CV-6260FE, 2004 WL 1429908 (W.D.N.Y. June 24, 2004) 
(holding that the court will assist pro se prisoner plaintiff by ordering prematurely-filed interrogatories to 
be served upon named defendants, along with non-frivolous complaint allegations); Garrett v. Miller, No. 
02 C 5437, 2003 WL 1790954,  at *3–4 (N.D. Ill. April 1, 2003) (holding that non-prisoner pro se plaintiff 
is entitled to assistance from the court in ascertaining proper defendants and obtaining proper service, by 
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¶44 Thus, the Court‘s ruling in Indiana v. Edwards that unwanted counsel could be 
imposed upon a ―gray area‖ defendant arose in the context of a set of previous decisions 
holding that human dignity and autonomy require constitutional recognition of the right 
to self-representation; that pro se litigants are required to comply with all legal rules; and 
that they are entitled to no assistance from the court.  But, to ensure a fair trial, and in the 
absence of any other alternative form of assistance or representation, the Edwards Court 
held that ―gray-area‖ defendants do not have an absolute right to represent themselves, 
and that the ―spectacle‖ in their cases may be avoided by the imposition of counsel.  This 
requires a closer examination of the notions of dignity, autonomy, and personhood before 
the law. 
III. DIGNITY, AUTONOMY, AND PERSONHOOD BEFORE THE LAW 
¶45 In this Part, I will describe the interrelationship between dignity, autonomy, and 
personhood before the law and individual freedom.  The Framers of the Constitution and 
the authors of the Declaration of Independence sought to protect freedom of all kinds: 
The self-evident truth was that all men and women were created equal in dignity, the 
dignity that implies autonomy and self-government and certain unalienable rights.
100
  
Most relevant here are (1) freedom of choice, (2) freedom as protection of basic rights 
relating to the justice system, and (3) freedom as moral constraint.
101
  While freedom has 
multiple meanings, all of its forms include the element of the absence of constraint or 
coercion:   
[A] man is said to be free to the extent that he can choose his own goals or 
course of conduct, can choose between alternatives available to him, and 
is not compelled to act as he would not himself choose to act, or prevented 
from acting as he would otherwise choose to act, by the will of another 
man, of the state, or of any other authority.
102 
  
¶46 The first refers to the relationship between an actor and a series of potential 
actions.
103
  The second refers to the classical liberal thought of Locke and others who 
advocated that the government ought to restrict a person‘s freedom only when necessary 
                                                                                                                                                 
ordering attorneys for defendants to provide plaintiff with their addresses); Valentin v. Dinkins, 121 F.3d 
72, 76 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that the district court must assist pro se prisoners with their inquiry into the 
identities of unknown defendants);  Meckley v. United States, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 9033, *4 n.3 (4th 
Cir. 1992) (―[T]he district court has some responsibility to assist pro se litigants who are unable to identify 
the proper defendant.‖). 
99
 However, Canadian  law  imposes a duty of reasonable judicial assistance to pro se civil litigants and 
criminal case defendants.  Jona Goldschmidt, Judicial Assistance to Self-Represented Litigants: Lessons 
from the Canadian Experience, 17 MICH. ST. J. INT‘L L. 601, 605 (2009).  
100
 Louis Henkin, Human Dignity and Constitutional Rights, in THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS: HUMAN 
DIGNITY AND AMERICAN VALUES 210, 213 (Michael J. Meyer & William A. Parent eds., 1992) [hereinafter 
Constitutional Rights]. 
101
 Felix E. Oppenheim, Freedom, in 5 INT‘L ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOC. SCIS. 554, 558–559 (David L. 
Sills ed. 1968).  
102
  P. H. Partridge, 3 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 221, 222 (Paul Edwards ed., 1967) [hereinafter 
Partridge] (defining ―freedom‖).  
103
 See Partridge, supra note102, at 222. 
NOR TH WES TERN JO U RN AL O F LAW AND SOC IA L P O LIC Y  [ 2 0 1 1  
 
146 
to protect another‘s basic rights.104  The third refers to valuational meanings of freedom 
and its defining expression: ―[A] person is often said to be free, not if he acts freely or 
develops his capacities, but if he realizes his ‗best‘ or ‗essential‘ self.‖105 
¶47 These concepts arose during the Enlightenment in the 17th and 18th centuries and 
became the cornerstone of modern liberalism and our constitutional democracy.
106
  
Inexorably linked to these concepts are the concepts of human dignity, autonomy, and 
personhood before the law.    
A. Merging and Evolving Meanings 
¶48 The Supreme Court‘s decision in Faretta v. California and its progeny contain 
repeated references to the concepts of dignity, autonomy, and personhood before the law 
as the sources and justifications for the right to self-representation.  The meaning of these 
terms has evolved over time, and the shift in usage of dignity in particular is reflected in 
North American jurisprudence.  Courts sometimes use the terms dignity, autonomy, and 
personhood interchangeably when resolving issues relating to self-representation, but 
these terms do not carry identical meanings.   
¶49 Dignity originally referred to a person‘s social rank.107  This was the meaning of 




 decisions.  The word dignity in its 
modern meaning has its origins in the Enlightenment.  The word then came to have other 
meanings, such as political and economic independence,
110
 the intrinsic worth of human 
                                                 
104
 See Oppenheim, supra note 101, at 556–57. 
105
 Id. at 558. 
106
 ―From the idea of the sanctity of the individual human soul, there emerged the conception of the 
liberties of the individual and the rights of man.‖  Milton Katz, Government Under Law and the Individual 
2  (1957), reprinted in J. C. Smith & David N. Weisstub, THE WESTERN IDEA OF LAW 465, 465 (1983).  As 
Justice Brandeis put it, ―What are American ideals?  They are the development of the individual for his 
own and the common good; the development of the individual through liberty, and the attainment of the 
common good through democracy and social justice.‖  LOUIS B. BRANDEIS, American Ideals, in THE 
BRANDEIS GUIDE TO THE MODERN WORLD 3, 3–4 (Alfred Lief ed., 1941). 
107
 Michael J. Meyer, Introduction, in THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS: HUMAN DIGNITY AND AM. VALUES 
1, 4–5 (Michael J. Meyer & William A. Parent eds., 1992) (noting that in their famous debate regarding the 
French Revolution, Edmund Burke used dignity to refer to the dignity of the nobility and the King, whereas 
Thomas Paine used the word to refer to the ―natural dignity of man,‖ a status enjoyed by all people). 
108
 See, e.g., Bell v. Hearne, 60 U.S. 252, 256 (1856) (noting that English King‘s great seal is the ―emblem 
of his royal authority and dignity‖); Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. 475, 485 (1866) (―[Respondent 
Johnson] is bound to take care of the dignity, the rights, and the prerogatives that belong to him as 
President.‖). 
109
 See, e.g., Re Holman and Rea [1912], 27 O.L.R. 432  (referring to ―judicial dignity‖); In re Queen's 
Counsel, [1896] 13 O.L.R. 792 (referring to ―sergeants-at-law, judges, knights, baronets, and other superior 
titles of dignity and honour‖); Regina v. Howland, [1887] O.J. No. 17, 14 O.A.R. 184, at ¶ 29 
(administration of justice ―is entitled to be surrounded with a dignity appropriate to its place in the 
constitution‖); McDougall v. Campbell, [1877] O.J. No. 100, 41 U.C.R. 332, at ¶ 49 (referring to lawyers‘  
―dignity or from the honour of their profession‖); see generally R. James Fyfe, Dignity as Theory: 
Competing Conceptions of Human Dignity at the Supreme Court of Canada, 70 SASK. L. REV. 1 (2007) 
[hereinafter Dignity as Theory] (discussing the concept of human dignity as it is used in Canadian law). 
110
 William A. Parent, Constitutional Values and Human Dignity, in THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS: 
HUMAN DIGNITY AND AM. VALUES 47, 50–51 (Michael J. Meyer & William A. Parent eds., 992) 
[hereinafter Constitutional Values]. 




 and freedom from (mis)treatment such as racial segregation, torture, or other 
human injustices.
112
  These additional meanings were a product of the influential 
philosophical thought of Immanuel Kant and the Enlightenment rejection of hierarchical 
valuations of human worth.
113
 This Enlightenment vision of dignity was ―tied 
inextricably to the human capacity and inclination for self-government.‖114 
¶50 Scholars suggest several ways of organizing the multiple meanings of dignity.115  
The modern essence of dignity of the person supervenes autonomy,
116
 a subject of great 
interest to philosophers since the Enlightenment.
117
  It has been defined as ―the capacity 
for self-government‖118 in political philosophy, but it has additional meanings in Kantian 
moral theory and applied ethics.   
                                                 
111
 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 270 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (arguing a ―cruel and unusual‖ 
punishment is one that does not comport with human dignity). 
112
 Constitutional Values, supra note 110, at 59.  Parent‘s argument is that ―moral dignity‖ underlies all 
meanings of dignity, and means that ―people suffer a grievous personal wrong when they are devalued for 
irrelevant reasons and that we have a valid moral claim, therefore, not to be disparaged.‖  Id. at 63.  This 
conception of dignity ―clarifies the important and intimate conceptual relation between the ideas of worth 
and respect.  It focuses attention on the significant connection between preserving one‘s worth and 
condemning unjust personal debasement.‖  Id. at 64. 
113
 Meyer, supra note 107, at 7.  
114 Id. 
115
 Alan Gewirth suggests an ―empirical‖ dignity in which dignity as adjective refers to a kind of ―gravity 
or decorum,‖ where someone can be said to have ―behaved with great dignity,‖ and ―inherent‖ dignity, a 
kind of ―intrinsic worth that belongs equally to all human beings‖ as such, and the ―familiar and plausible‖ 
definition of dignity as the recognizable capacity to assert rights and make moral claims.  Alan Gewirth, 
Human Dignity as the Basis of Rights, in THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS: HUMAN DIGNITY AND AM. 
VALUES 10, 11–13 (Michael J. Meyer & William A. Parent eds., 1992).  Professor Brownsword argues for 
―dignity-as-liberty‖ and ―dignity-as-constraint,‖ where the former refers to those forms of dignity which 
relate to the view that human beings have inherent value and inalienable human rights, such as human 
autonomy and the freedom to make important life choices, and the latter as the dignity that is affected by 
governmental constraints because they relate to the community‘s idea of civilized life and what is distinctly 
valued about human existence, such as the legally constrained activities of human organ commerce, 
prostitution, commercial surrogacy, and gene patenting.  Roger Brownsword, Bioethics Today, Bioethics 
Tomorrow: Stem Cell Research and the “Dignitarian Alliance,‖ 17 NOTRE DAME. J.L. ETHICS & PUB. 
POL‘Y 15 (2003); Roger Brownsword, An Interest in Human Dignity as the Basis for Genomic Torts, 42 
WASHBURN L.J. 413 (2003).  On this account, such activities compromise the actor‘s dignity.  Also, 
Professor Fyfe argues for a new conception of dignity, one that protects the vulnerability of individuals and 
groups, which he views as a preferred purpose of § 3 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.  
Dignity as Theory, supra note 109, at 22.  That section provides: ―Every individual is equal before and 
under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination 
and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age 
or mental or physical disability.‖  Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule 
B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.).  
116
 Supervenience is a dependence relationship between properties or facts of one type, and properties or 
facts of another type. OXFORD COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY 860 (Ted Honderich ed., 1995).  Gewirth 
describes the relationship as residing between dignity and rights: ―[A] person[] has human rights because 
they have inherent human dignity.‖  GEWIRTH, SELF-FULFILLMENT 163 (1998).  Here the relevant concept 
of rights is normative, not positive.  Id. at 168–69. 
117
 See generally LAWRENCE HAWORTH, AUTONOMY: AN ESSAY IN PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY AND 
ETHICS (1986) [hereinafter AUTONOMY];  GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY 
(1988); RICHARD LINDLEY, AUTONOMY (1986); FREE WILL (Gary Watson ed., 2d ed. 2003). 
118
 SIMON BLACKBURN, THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 31 (1994) (defining 
autonomy/heteronomy).  Professor Allen Wood summarizes the principle this way: 
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¶51 Kant developed his understanding of autonomy in relation to the question of which 
acts have moral worth.
119
  He viewed autonomy as the ability to know what morality 
requires of us, which functions not as freedom to pursue our ends, but as the power of an 
agent to act on objective and universally valid rules of conduct, certified by reason 
alone.
120
  This rests on the notion that the ―dignity of mankind consists in this capacity of 
making general laws, [and] always provides that it is itself subject to these laws.‖121  To 
Kant, autonomy is the ―innate power of reason, the capacity of each individual to think 
and choose, not only to shape his or her own life but also to protect and promote 
reciprocal respect by enacting laws that can form the legal structure of life for 
everyone.‖122  This power and responsibility is autonomy, and the power of autonomy is 
what gives every person moral authority and status against the ―might of the state.‖123  
                                                                                                                                                 
 The fundamental egalitarianism built into the idea of human dignity can be understood as 
the most direct basis of many modern political and legal conceptions and principles. 
These include that governmental authority ought properly to exist and be exercised only 
with the consent of the governed, that political power should be based on the rule of law, 
not the arbitrary power of individuals or groups, and that everyone falling under such a 
system should have the right to participate in the decisions that determine what these laws 
are and who should be granted the authority to enforce them. 
Allen Wood, Human Dignity, Right and the Realm of Ends, in Dignity Freedom and the Post-Apartheid 
Legal Order: The Critical Jurisprudence of Laurie Ackermann (Jaco Bernard-Naude, Francois du Bois & 
Drucilla Cornell eds., 2009).  
119
 ―Stated simply, [Kant‘s moral philosophy is that] our actions are of moral worth when we do the right 
thing because it is right, and not for what benefit we can get out of it.  Despite his sometimes difficult 
technical vocabulary, Kant‘s theory of ethics is simple, direct, and in many ways in accord with the ethics 
of common sense.‖  JOSEPH G. BRENNAN, FOUNDATIONS OF MORAL OBLIGATION: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO 
ETHICS AND MORALITY 87–88 (1992).  
120
 BLACKBURN, supra note 118, at 31.  In contrast to autonomy, Kant posited ―heteronomy,‖ which he 
defined as ―the condition of acting on desires, which are not legislated by reason.‖  Id.  A recent extension 
of the Kantian conception of autonomy in applied ethics is assisted suicide.  It has been argued that to 
deprive one of life is to violate their autonomy, which implies that the moral prohibition against taking a 
life doesn‘t apply to a case of someone wishing to end his or her life.  Autonomy is also used in medical 
ethics as the basis for informed consent, and in political philosophy where the idea of persons as 
autonomous agents underlies liberal theories of justice.  A new conception of autonomy, however, has 
begun to emerge, one involving more than the capacity to act on particular desires and choices: ―It suggests 
a moral general capacity to be self-determining, to be in control of one‘s own life.‖ THE OXFORD 
COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY 70 (Ted Honderich ed.,1995).  The self-representation movement may be, 
inter alia, a manifestation of this expanded view of autonomy. 
121
 Immanuel Kant, Metaphysical Foundations of Morals, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF KANT: IMMANUEL 
KANT‘S MORAL AND POLITICAL WRITINGS 154, 206 (Carl J. Friedrich ed., 1993).  Kant‘s Universal 
Principle of Justice says that only those civil arrangements that allow the most freedom for everyone alike 
are just, which is stated in an imperative for citizens: ―Behave in such a way that your choices are 
compatible with the greatest amount of external freedom for everyone.‖  ROGER J. SULLIVAN, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO KANT‘S ETHICS 12 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Kant‘s categorical 
imperative is a declaration, with three formulations and a few paraphrases, which states the moral law to 
guide the autonomous person in a free society.  Id. at 29.  The general statement, or first variation, is: ―I 
ought never to act in such a way that I could not also will that my maxim should be a universal law.‖  Id. 
122
 Sullivan, supra note 121, at 15.  To Kant, the responsible man is ―autonomous‖ in that he arrives at 
moral decisions which he expresses to himself in the form of imperatives; ―he gives laws to himself, or is 
self-legislating.‖  ROBERT PAUL WOLFF, IN DEFENSE OF ANARCHISM (1970), reprinted in SMITH & 
WEISSTUB, supra note 106, at 469, 470–71. 
123
 Id.  To Kant, a state can be based on (1) force, (2) arbitrary desires of a despot, or (3) on the rule of law 
based on respect for every citizen and on the rational ability of each person to take responsibility for 
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¶52 The second important Kantian principle relevant to the state‘s treatment of a pro se 
defendant is his notion of respect-for-persons: ―Man, and generally every rational being, 
exists as an end in himself, not merely as a means for the arbitrary use of this or that will; 
he must always be regarded as an end in all his actions whether aimed at himself or at 
other rational beings.‖125  Kant‘s ―second formulation‖ of his categorical imperative 
reflecting this idea is: ―Act so as to treat man, in your own person as well as in that of 
anyone else, always as an end, never merely as a means.‖126  To Kant, one of the worst 
forms of immorality is ―to use a person as an instrument, while making the person believe 
that you are doing good to him or her for that person‘s own sweet sake.‖127   
¶53  Finally, ―personhood‖ before the law is not a philosophical but a legal term.128  It 
is one the Supreme Court has used on several occasions to refer to the amalgam of an 
individual‘s rights to both dignity and autonomy.  As discussed later,129 there are eight 
categories of constitutional claims that are linked to dignity and autonomy where the 
Court has either held that its decision is made to advance human dignity, or has rejected 
claims based on dignity concerns in favor of a compelling state interest.
130
 
¶54 Thus, we see how the philosophical conceptions of autonomy, the dignity of the 
individual, and freedom are closely intertwined, and how the Supreme Court in Faretta 
properly found that the right to self-representation was based on their foundation. Before 
turning to the application of these concepts to Indiana v. Edwards, I will briefly review 
the manner in which dignity and autonomy have been applied in American, Canadian, 
and international jurisprudence.  
                                                                                                                                                 
himself or herself.  Sullivan, supra note 121, at 13.  Kant‘s laws of ―natural justice‖ prohibit behavior that 
would (1) infringe on the person of others, (2) on their status of equality, (3) on their ability to be self-
determining, and (4) to function responsibly and with dignity, or (5) on anything to which they have title, 
such as property, and (6) legislating the obligation of parents to care for their children.  Id. at 14. 
124
 Wolff, supra note 122, at 471. 
125
 Kant, supra note 121, at 194; see NORMAN, supra note 121, at 102. 
126
 Kant, supra note 121, at 195. 
127
 Brennan, supra note 119, at 92; see also AUTONOMY, supra note 117, at 1–8.  Haworth‘s dichotomy is 
similar to the Professor Brownsord‘s dignity-as-liberty and dignity-as-restraint typology.  Professor 
Haworth categorizes autonomy into descriptive and normative definitions; the former referring to, for 
example, personal characteristics including being in charge of one‘s life and self-control, and the latter 
referring to the case of one who complains of interference from others, whereby a claim of right to 
autonomy is made. 
128
 The word ―personhood‖ does not appear in standard philosophy dictionaries, which instead contains 
references to ―persons,‖ ―personal identity,‖ and ―personalism,‖ none of which relate directly to our 
discussion of dignity and autonomy.  See, e.g. THE OXFORD COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY 654–55 (Ted 
Honderich ed., 1995); Peter A. Angeles, DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 208 (1981).     
129
 See infra notes 157–159 and accompanying text. 
130
  Maxine D. Goodman, Human Dignity in Supreme Court Constitutional Jurisprudence, 84 NEB. L. REV. 
740, 757–59 (2003) [hereinafter Human Dignity]. 
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B. Legal Usage 
1. American Usage 
¶55 To the drafters of the Declaration of Independence and the Framers of the 
Constitution, ―the self-evident truth was that all men and women were created equal in 
human dignity, the dignity that implies autonomy and self-government and certain 
unalienable rights.‖131  The Framers designed the federal government‘s structure on a 
political theory rooted in rights.
132
  The right to self-representation was not explicitly 
included in the text of the U.S. Constitution or in the Bill of Rights, but has been 
recognized since 1948 in a federal statute that provides: ―In all courts of the United 
States, the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel . . . 
.‖133  The statutes and constitutions of thirty six states also provide for the right of self-
representation.
134
   
¶56 Through the various interpretations of the due process clause that have sought to 
protect liberty, one finds the groundwork supporting individual autonomy.
135
  Yet, while 
scholars assert that the use of human dignity in constitutional jurisprudence is ―episodic 
and underdeveloped,‖136 the Supreme Court continues to embed dignity in its 
constitutional decisions.
137
   
                                                 
131
 Constitutional Rights, supra note 100, at 214.    
132
 See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE preamble (U.S. 1776) (―WE hold these Truths to be self-
evident, that all Men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable 
Rights, that among these Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness—That to secure these Rights, 
Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just Powers from the Consent of the Governed . . . 
.‖).   
133
 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (2006).   
134
 See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 813 n. 10 (1975) (noting that states differ in their grant to an 
accused of the right to proceed pro se in person and by counsel and either by himself or herself, by counsel, 
or both).  Some scholars argue that the Founders assumed rather than articulated rights based on their view 
that the Founders believed that the rights explicitly protected by contemporaneous state constitutions would 
serve as more important protections than the Constitution.  Constitutional Rights, supra note 131, at 213–
14. 
135
 See, e.g., Constitutional Rights, supra note 131, at 221.   
Liberty includes autonomy in intimate matters—to marry or not to marry, to practice 
contraception, to have an abortion . . . .   
By interpreting the constitutional powers of Congress broadly, the courts have 
unleashed and encouraged Congress to expand individual rights and promote dignity—by 
the New Deal and the Great Society; by comprehensive civil rights legislation outlawing 
private as well as official invasions; by a Freedom of Information Act opening 
government to the scrutiny of the governed. 
Id. at 223. 
136
 Vickie C. Jackson, Constitutional Dialogue and Human Dignity: States and Transnational Discourse, 
65 MONT. L. REV. 15, 17 (2004). 
137
 See Judith Resnik & Julie Chi-hye Suk, Adding Insult to Injury: Questioning the Role of Dignity in 
Conceptions of Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1921, 1926 (2003); see also Human Dignity, supra note 130, 
at 743, 789 (describing the Supreme Court‘s use of dignity since the 1940‘s as a ―constitutional value‖ 
underlying, or giving meaning to, many constitutional rights and guarantees); Jordan J. Paust, Human 
Dignity as a Constitutional Right: A Jurisprudentially Based Inquiry into Criteria and Content, 27 HOW. L. 
J. 145, 181 (1984) (noting that dignity has been used by the Supreme Court in the interpretation of the First, 
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth amendments).   
[T]he concept of dignity is extremely broad. It has been used, perhaps as it always 
should, as an open-ended and dynamic constitutional precept that is often interdependent 
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¶57 Dignity in its modern sense was first used during and after World War II.  In 
Korematsu v. U.S., the Supreme Court upheld a wartime evacuation and internment order 
of persons of Japanese descent on the West Coast.
 138
  Writing in dissent, Justice Murphy 
described discriminatory government action against Japanese-Americans as ―destroy[ing] 
the dignity of the individual.‖ 139  
¶58 In the Supreme Court‘s modern jurisprudence, human dignity generally trumps 
state interests where those interests involve Fourteenth Amendment liberty
140
 and equal 
protection claims;
 141 
the Fifth Amendment right to be free from self-incrimination;
142
 the 
Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizure;
143
 and the 
Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.
144
  The Court, 
                                                                                                                                                 
with most of our constitutional rights and a fundamental belief in the inherent dignity and 
worth of every human person.  
. . .  Nevertheless, no organizing jurisprudence is yet discernible. . . .  [I]t is 
ultimately intertwined with much of our juristic thinking about civil and political rights 
and freedom . . . . 
Id. at 149.  Canadian scholars have also found that the use of dignity by Canadian courts is inconsistent and 
its meaning has been ―under-analyzed.‖  Dignity as Theory, supra note 109, at 6.  Dignity, according to 
Professor Fyfe, has become ―at times an empty but rhetorically powerful vessel into which any variety of 
normative ingredients can be placed.‖  Id. at 9.   
138
 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).  
139
 Id. at 240.  Professor Paust erroneously cites Justice Murphy‘s dissent in In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 29 
(1946) (Murphy, J., dissenting) as when the word dignity in its current usage was first inaugurated.  Paust, 
supra note 137, at 151.  Two years earlier the Court decided another case in which dignity was used in a 
way that combined both its earlier meaning referring to high social standing and its modern meaning 
referring to the essence of being human.  See Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 304 (1944) (discussing the 
complainant‘s interest as needing to ―rise to the dignity of an interest personal to him and not possessed by 
the people generally‖).   
140
 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003) (holding that ―[l]iberty presumes an autonomy 
of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct‖).  Justice 
Kennedy also noted that human dignity permits one to make personal choices in the context of intimate 
relationships; it permits persons in their private homes and lives to ―retain their dignity as free persons.‖  
Id. at 567.   
141
 See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Shawnee Cnty., Kan., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) 
(emphasizing the demeaning impact on black children of separate but equal education); Heart of Atlanta 
Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 250 (1964) (reasoning that the fundamental object of Title II of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was to vindicate the personal dignity accompanying denials of public access to 
public establishments); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 625 (1984) (upholding a gender 
anti-discrimination statute because deprivation of personal dignity suffered by race discrimination victims 
was ―surely felt as strongly‖ by those discriminated upon on the basis of sex).   
142
 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 457 (1966) (reasoning that certain inherently coercive interrogation 
environment can be destructive of human dignity). 
143
 City of Ontario, California v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2627 (2010) (citing Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. 
Ass‘n, 489 U.S. 602, 613–14 (1989)) (noting that the Fourth Amendment guarantees, inter alia, the dignity 
of persons against certain arbitrary acts by governmental officials without regard to whether the 
government actor is investigating crime or performing another function).  
144
 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958). Professor Goodman notes that Fourth and Eighth Amendment 
decisions are ―inconsistent and sporadic‖ in terms of their use of human dignity:  
[T]he decisions ―are inconsistent with the Court‘s strong rhetoric regarding human 
dignity and sporadic in that the Court appeared to follow public opinion and/or the 
executive branch‘s agenda in deciding the strength to give human dignity as a value in its 
decision-making, rather than treating dignity as invariant, an independent constitutional 
precept that should be factored into its decision-making regardless of public opinion. 
Human Dignity, supra note 130, at 757–58. 
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however, sets limits on this theory, ruling in favor of state interests over dignity interests 
in some Fourteenth Amendment cases.  For example, state interests trump human dignity 
concerns where cases involve a person‘s ability under the Fourteenth Amendment Due 
Process Clause to choose how and when to die when near death;
145
 claims under the Due 
Process and Equal Protection Clauses for economic assistance from the government;
146
 
and First Amendment claims to freedom of expression when balanced against the 
opposing right of an individual to his public image
147
   
¶59 In the economic rights realm, Goldberg v. Kelly148 upheld the right to a pre-
termination hearing for public welfare benefits reductions based in part on Justice 
Brennan‘s linking of the constitutional claim for a means of survival, pending the benefit 
decision, to dignity, that is, ―the Nation‘s basic commitment . . . to foster the dignity and 
well-being of all persons within its borders.‖149  Unfortunately, as Professor Goodman 
notes: ―[T]he Court‘s willingness to advance human dignity in welfare rights cases 
faltered‖ in later cases.150  Also, despite holding that human dignity requires protection of 
a woman‘s right to choose, ―human dignity was outweighed when the government had to 
get involved by paying for that freedom.‖151   
¶60 A similar trend has been observed in the case of individual autonomy.  Professor 
Erica Hashimoto gives the following appraisal of its recent application by courts: ―[T]he 
autonomy interest of criminal defendants is under [an] all-out siege . . . [and] most 
commentators have either expressed little concern or offered endorsement‖ of the trend 
that is increasingly restrictive of individual autonomy as reflected, for example, in court 
rulings dealing with the authority of lawyers to overrule their clients‘ preferences 
regarding trial strategies.
152
  The decision in Indiana v. Edwards appears to have been a 
product of these recent trends. 
¶61 Recall that the Court‘s primary concern in Edwards was with the ―fairness‖ of the 
proceedings from the perspective of an observer.  This position reflects another parallel 
                                                 
145
 Goodman notes that in right-to-die and physician-assisted suicide cases, the court acknowledged human 
dignity concerns, but determined that they are outweighed by state interests.  Human Dignity, supra note 
130, at 758. 
146
 These include cases where the state‘s lack of involvement is challenged, for example the state‘s failure 
to provide economic assistance via waiver of an administrative fee, or failure to provide financial assistance 
equally.  Id.  ―Human dignity has routinely failed to defeat competing state concerns in these cases.‖  Id. 
147
 These claims consist of competing dignity claims of freedom of speech and the interest in preserving 
one‘s reputation as a different form of dignity.  They involve not only ―conduct that demeans or humiliates 
as a result of private, rather than state, action[,]‖ but also the interest in dignity as free speech as a means of 
preserving the political system and producing a more capable citizenry.  Id. at 758–59. 
148
 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
149
 Id. at 264–65. 
150
 Human Dignity, supra note 130, at 784.  Professor Goodman cites a number of cases.  Dandridge v. 
Williams rejected an equal protection challenge to a state cap on welfare benefits regardless of number of 
children.  Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).  United States v. Kras held that a fee for access to 
bankruptcy court despite indigency was not a denial of equal protection because, unlike the fundamental 
interest in marriage and the court as an exclusive place for its dissolution – where the filing fee must be 
waived for indigents – there is no fundamental right to bankruptcy.  United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 
(1973).  Finally, Harris v. McRae held that there is no due process right to federally-funded, but 
constitutionally protected, abortion.  Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).  
151
 Human Dignity, supra note 130, at 785.  
152
 Erica J. Hashimoto, Resurrecting Autonomy: The Criminal Defendant’s Right to Control the Case, 90 
B.U. L. REV. 1147, 1149–50 (2010). 
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shift in the court‘s reasoning.  In the pre-Faretta case of Adams v. U.S. ex rel. McCann,153 
the Court held that a felony defendant could personally waive his right to a jury trial 
without first having unwanted counsel imposed upon him when he makes a ―free and 
intelligent choice‖ to waive both of these rights.154  In its reasoning, the Court noted: 
―Essential fairness is lacking if an accused cannot put his case effectively in court. But 
the Constitution does not force a lawyer upon a defendant. He may waive his 
Constitutional right to assistance of counsel if he knows what he is doing and his choice 
is made with eyes open.‖155  The Court, however, did not engage in any search for the 
historical or philosophical roots of the right to self-representation other than to say that it 
was protected by the Bill of Rights generally.
156
 
¶62 Prior to Adams, federal courts differed on whether the right was of constitutional 
dimension or statutorily based.
157
  The Supreme Court in Faretta v. California
158
 resolved 
                                                 
153
 Adams v. U.S. ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269 (1942). 
154
 Id. at 275.  
155
 Id. at 279 (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)). In Johnson, the Court remanded a 
habeas corpus case to the trial court to determine whether the defendant had made an ―intelligent waiver‖ 
of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and held that the waiver ―must depend, in each case, upon the 
particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and 
conduct of the accused.‖ Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464.  It is interesting to note that Johnson, a case involving a 
defendant who sought and did not receive counsel, is precedent for McCann, a case involving a defendant 
forced to have counsel over his demand to be self-represented. 
156
 The Court in Adams reasoned: 
 [T]he procedural safeguards of the Bill of Rights are not to be treated as mechanical 
rigidities. What were contrived as protections for the accused should not be turned into 
fetters. To assert as an absolute that a layman, no matter how wise or experienced he may 
be, is incompetent to choose between judge and jury as the tribunal for determining his 
guilt or innocence, simply because a lawyer has not advised him on the choice, is to 
dogmatize beyond the bounds of learning or experience. Were we so to hold, we would 
impliedly condemn the administration of criminal justice in states deemed otherwise 
enlightened merely because in their courts the vast majority of criminal cases are tried 
before a judge without a jury. To deny an accused a choice of procedure in circumstances 
in which he, though a layman, is as capable as any lawyer of making an intelligent 
choice, is to impair the worth of great Constitutional safeguards by treating them as 
empty verbalisms. 
317 U.S. at 279–80.  Noteworthy, however, in this first Supreme Court opinion dealing with the right of 
self-representation are the following comments regarding application of the rules of evidence and 
procedure on pro se cases, which would later be disavowed in a line of cases beginning with Faretta v. 
California, see infra Part I.B.:   
 The less rigorous enforcement of the rules of evidence, the greater informality in trial 
procedure—these are not the only advantages that the absence of a jury may afford to a 
layman who prefers to make his own defense.  In a variety of subtle ways trial by jury 
may be restrictive of a layman's opportunities to present his case as freely as he wishes. 
And since trial by jury confers burdens as well as benefits, an accused should be 
permitted to forego its privileges when his competent judgment counsels him that his 
interests are safer in the keeping of the judge than of the jury. 
Id. at 279. 
157
 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Soto v. United States, 504 F.2d 1339, 1343 (3d Cir. 1974) (holding that 
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel was a constitutional requirement, and thus directly inconsistent with 
any right to self-representation); Bayless v. United States, 381 F.2d 67, 71 (9th Cir. 1967) (holding the right 
was constitutionally protected); Arnold v. United States, 414 F.2d 1056, 1058 (9th Cir. 1969).  But see 
Brown v. United States, 264 F.2d 363, 365–66 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (holding in a plurality opinion that right is 
no more than statutory in nature). 
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the dispute and held that the right was indeed constitutionally protected, and that the right 
was violated by a California court‘s ruling that forced the criminal defendant in that case 
to accept appointment of a public defender against his will.  The court extensively 
reviewed the history of self-representation in England and the United States, finding that, 
―The Founders believed that self-representation was a basic right of free people.  
Underlying this belief was not only the antilawyer sentiment of the populace, but also the 
‗natural law‘ thinking that characterized the revolution‘s spokesmen.‖159   
¶63 Recognizing that a defendant who conducts his own defense may do so to his own 
detriment, the Court held that ―his choice must be honored out of ‗that respect for the 
individual which is the lifeblood of the law.‘‖160  The Court concluded that "[u]nless the 
accused has acquiesced in [representation through counsel], the defense presented is not 
the defense guaranteed him by the Constitution, for, in a very real sense, it is not his 
defense.‖161   
2. Canadian Usage 
¶64 Despite the claim of some that foreign and international law are irrelevant to 
constitutional interpretation,
162
 it can prove instructive by providing judges with 
alternative approaches to common challenges, such as the growth of pro se litigation and 
the problem of ―gray area‖ pro se defendants.163  In Canadian jurisprudence, for example, 
we see commonality in the evolution of courts‘ use of dignity in the context of self-
representation.  The meaning of dignity changed—as it did in American law—from a 
                                                                                                                                                 
158
 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 836 (1975).  
159
 Id. at 830, n.39 (citations omitted). 
160
 Id. at 834 (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 350–51 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)).  Justice 
Brennan‘s view was that human dignity is the fundamental value affirmed by the Constitution of the U.S. 
and the Bill of Rights.  William Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary 
Ratification, 43 GUILD PRAC. 1 (1986); Meyer, supra note 107, at 1. 
161
 Faretta, 422 U.S. at 821.  The defendant‘s dignity in making the choice to defend himself was not the 
only dignity referred to in Faretta.  The court also referred to the need to preserve the court‘s own dignity:  
"The right of self-representation is not a license to abuse the dignity of the courtroom. Neither is it a license 
not to comply with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law."  Id. at 834 n.46.  
 The Court also suggested that in future cases standby counsel could be appointed as a third option 
in addition to the defendant proceeding pro se and the appointment of counsel: "Of course, a State may—
even over objection by the accused—appoint a 'standby counsel' to aid the accused if and when the accused 
requests help, and to be available to represent the accused in the event that termination of the defendant's 
self-representation is necessary.‖  Id. 
162
 See, e.g., Justice Antonin Scalia, Remarks at U.S. Association of Constitutional Law Discussion, 
Constitutional Relevance of Foreign Court Decisions, American University, Washington College of Law 
(Jan.13, 2005) (―[I]f you talk about using it constitutional law, you know, you talk about it's nice to know 
that, you know, that we're on the right track, that we have a same moral and legal framework as the rest of 
the world.  But we don't have the same moral and legal framework as the rest of the world, and never 
have.‖).  Contra Geralf L. Neuman, International Law as a Resource in Constitutional Interpretation, 30 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 177, 189 (2006) (―The [U.S.] is a nation of immigrants, and it has always had the 
good sense to borrow sound ideas . . . from abroad. That has been true in . . .  constitutional law. We rightly 
take pride in our national accomplishments, but the pragmatic assimilation of new perspectives is one of 
our national virtues.‖).   
163
 Comparative constitutional law is ―an important tool for understanding one‘s own legal system,‖ and 
―can be an important stimulus to legal self-reflection.‖  Sujit Choudhry, Globalization in Search of 
Justification: Toward a Theory of Comparative Constitutional Interpretation, 74 IND. L.J. 819, 835–36 
(1999). 
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focus on social standing, reputation, and image,
164
  to a reference to the dignity that is the 
essence of persons, especially persons before the law.  Canadian courts, like U.S. courts, 
historically and presently view the right to self-representation as a given.    Canadian 
courts have traced the source of the right of self-representation to ―traditional common 
law rules which have become so firmly imbedded in our judicial system that a conviction 
is very difficult to sustain on appeal if they are not observed.‖165  Most cases, however, 
simply refer to the right as ―a right‖ without further explication or discussion.166  
Interestingly, the principal American (Faretta v. California
167
) and Canadian (Vescio v. 
The King
168
) decisions recognizing the right to self-representation cite to a common 
English decision (Rex v. Woodward
169
).  The language in Vescio cited most often by 
courts is: 
It is a fundamental principle of our criminal law that the choice of counsel 
is the choice of the accused himself, that no person charged with a 
criminal offence can have counsel forced upon him against his will, and 
that it is the paramount right of the accused to make his own case to the 
                                                 
164
 See cases cited supra Part III.B.1. 
165
 As noted in Darlyn:  
There are two.  The first is, that if the accused is without counsel, the court shall extend 
its helping hand to guide him throughout the trial in such a way that his defence, or any 
defence the proceedings may disclose, is brought out to the jury with its full force and 
effect.  The second is, that it is not enough that the verdict in itself appears to be correct, 
if the course of the trial has been unfair to the accused.  An accused is deemed to be 
innocent, it is in point to emphasize, not until he is found guilty, but until he is found 
guilty according to law. 
R. v. Darlyn, (1946), 88 C.C.C. 269, 271–72 (B.C. C.A.). 
166
 See, e.g., R. v. McGibbon, 1988 CanLII 149 (ON. C.A.) (upholding its earlier statement that "An 
accused . . . has the right to defend himself and no one has the right to force counsel on him against his 
wishes‖). 
167
 As noted in Faretta: 
 In more recent years, Parliament has provided for court appointment of counsel in serious criminal 
cases, but only at the accused's request. . . At no point in this process of reform in England was 
counsel ever forced upon the defendant. The common-law rule, succinctly stated in R. v. 
Woodward, [1944] K.B. 118, 119, [1944] 1 All E.R. 159, 160, has evidently always been that "no 
person charged with a criminal offence can have counsel forced upon him against his will. 
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 825–26 (1975) (citation omitted).   
168
 Vescio v. The King. [1949] S.C.R. 139 (S.C.C.).  In Vescio, the attorney for the defendant, charged with 
murder, withdrew from the case.  Id. at 141.  The court then appointed counsel for the defendant.  Id. at 
142.  At the eleventh hour before trial, a partner of defendant‘s first counsel attempted to request an 
adjournment of the trial so that his partner who had previously withdrawn could re-enter the case at a later 
date; the court, however, refused to hear the application, which became one of his issues on appeal.  Id. at 
143.  The defendant argued that his right to make a full answer and defense to the charges against him was 
infringed because he was denied his right to his counsel of choice.  Id.  In rejecting the defendant‘s 
argument, the Supreme Court of Canada noted that the defendant neither objected to the appointment of 
counsel, nor demanded to represent himself.  Id. at 143.  Therefore, the appeal was dismissed, affirming the 
conviction.  Id. at 156.  Thus, it could be argued that any language in Vescio pertaining to the self-
representation is dicta, because self-representation was not an issue in the case. 
169
 [1944] 1 All ER 159. 
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¶65 In Woodward, after the court appointed counsel for the defendant based upon his 
indigence, the defendant objected to the appointment, stating that he ought to be allowed 
to conduct his own defense.  Despite additional protestations during the trial, the trial 
judge did not allow the defendant to represent himself.  The Court of Criminal Appeal of 
England held: ―We think that no person charged with a criminal offence can have counsel 
forced upon him against his will,‖ 171 without invoking the philosophical concepts of 
dignity and autonomy.  Rather, the right was taken as a given.   
¶66 While autonomy is not mentioned in Woodward, later decisions would include 
statements such as that of Justice Hill in R. v. Romanowicz, where the court denied the 
pro se defendant‘s appeal in which he claimed that his non-lawyer representative failed to 
provide him with effective assistance of counsel:  
The accused has a right to self-representation. . . The court cannot, from a 
paternalistic perspective, force counsel upon an unwilling accused . . . an 
accused person has control over the decision of whether to have counsel . . 
. . 
. . . .  
An accused who has not been found unfit to stand trial must be permitted 
to conduct his own defence, even if this means that the accused may act to 
his own detriment in doing so. The autonomy of the accused in the 
adversarial system requires that the accused should be able to make such 
fundamental decisions and assume the risks involved. 
. . . .  
Where an accused, knowledgeable of the right to have counsel, chooses 
not to be represented by a lawyer, the trial judge must act with heightened 
vigilance in furtherance of the overarching obligation to ensure the 
accused has a fair trial.
172
 
                                                 
170
 Vescio v. The King, [1949] S.C.R. 139, 142.  Justice Rand‘s additional (concurring) opinion in Vescio 
contains two other oft-cited passages touching upon the right of self-representation.  First, commenting on a 
judge forcing counsel upon the defendant, Justice Rand wrote that a judge doing so ―might be authorizing a 
defence which the prisoner himself would never have made and yet for which he must be responsible.‖  Id.  
He also noted that there is no rule ―that defence by counsel is a necessary part of the machinery of trial.‖  
Id. 
171
 Id. at 160–61. 
172
 1998 CanLII 14957, para. 30, 33 (Can. On. S.C.) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(holding no right to effective assistance of counsel from paid non-lawyer agent).  Interestingly, the 
Supreme Court of Canada has held, in the context of an interpretation of § 7 of the Charter (preventing 
denials of rights to life, liberty, and security of the person inconsistent with principles of ―fundamental 
justice‖), that respect for human dignity is not protected.  The court held that respect for human dignity, 
while one of the underlying principles upon which our society is based, is not a principle of fundamental 
justice within the meaning of that section. Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] 3 
S.C.R. 519 (Can.) (upholding law prohibiting assisted suicide).  The court also noted that a mere common 
law rule does not ipso fact constitute a principle of fundamental justice.  Id.     
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¶67 The court in Romanowicz was not addressing the case of a ―gray-area‖ pro se 
defendant as was the case in Edwards.  However, in R. Swain,
173
 the Supreme Court of 
Canada addressed a challenge to a common law rule allowing the Crown to present 
evidence of the defendant‘s insanity over his objection.  In striking down the rule in the 
context of a ―gray-area‖ defendant because it violated certain provisions of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the court first noted that ―principles of fundamental 
justice contemplate an accusatorial and adversarial system of criminal justice which is 
founded on respect for the autonomy and dignity of the person.  These principles require 
that an accused person have the right to control his or her own defence.‖174  The court 
justified its decision to strike down the rule by pointing out that it,  
denies the mentally disabled, a group in our society which has been 
negatively stereotyped and historically disadvantaged, the control over 
their defences reposed in other accused persons and does so in a way 
which is discriminatory.  In denying the mentally disabled personal 
autonomy in decision-making it reinforces the stereotype that they are 




¶68 A case more comparable to Edwards is R. v. Peepeetch.176  There, the defendant 
was charged with the first-degree murder and mutilation of his estranged common-law 
wife and her lover.
177
  After being charged, the defendant was examined by two 
psychiatrists.  One found that the defendant at times was coherent, while at other times 
excitable, prone to going off on tangents, and unable to focus on the matters at hand, 
causing impairment of his ability to communicate with counsel.
178
  The second expert 
found that the defendant was fit to stand trial, though he was deliberately uncooperative 
and unresponsive, always reverting back to claims and allegations against others.
179
  The 
defendant was ultimately found fit to stand trial, and—after numerous adjournments 
necessitated by his discharge of several attorneys—he was forced to represent himself 
and was found guilty.
180
      
¶69 In his appeal to the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal, the defendant argued that he 
was unfit to stand trial, his waiver of counsel was invalid, and that the trial court erred in 
allowing him to represent himself because he lacked the capacity to do so.
181
  The case, 
therefore, differs slightly from Edwards in that the defendant there was denied the right 
to self-representation based on his lack of mental competence, while the defendant in 
                                                 
173
 1 S.C.R. 933 (Can).  
174
 Id.  
175
 Id.  The court fashioned a new procedure allowing the prosecution to raise insanity at the conclusion of 
the guilt or innocence phase of the case.  Id. 
176
 (2003) 238 Sask. R. 14 (Can.). 
177
 Id. at paras. 22–27. 
178
 Id. at para. 37.  
179
 Id. at para. 38. 
180
 Id. at paras. 39–40.  The court noted that his last attorney, who had been appointed amicus curiae, had 
―valiantly attempted to assist the appellant as a friend of the court,‖ until released from that obligation by 
the court.  Id. at para. 40. 
181
 Id. at para. 41. 
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Peepeetch argued that he was forced to proceed pro se despite his lack of mental 
competence.
182
   
¶70 The Peepeetch court rejected the defendant‘s claim that his right of self-
representation is not absolute, but rather is qualified by the mental disorder from which 
he suffered.
183
  The court found that the defendant was able to understand complex legal 
issues, such as voir dire.
184
  Noting that the court in R. v. Whittle, following Godinez, had 
held that the standard for determining whether an accused could represent himself is not 
higher than the standard for waiver of the right to counsel, the Peepeetch court ruled that 
―by choosing to represent himself, which is a constitutionally protected right, the 
appellant effectively gave up the right to effective assistance of counsel.‖185  
Significantly, the court noted the manner in which the trial judge followed the 
―overriding and overarching principle that the accused is entitled to a fair trial‖ by 
providing assistance to him in a variety of ways.
186
  ―The trial judge attempted, without 
descending from the bench and becoming the accused‘s counsel, to ensure the proper 
conduct of the defence and to guide him through the trial so that his defence could be 
                                                 
182
 There were, however, a number of similarities between the cases.  The court first discussed the 
American case Godinez v. Moran, and its Canadian counterpart R. v. Whittle, as well as other Canadian 
authorities recognizing the ―right of the accused to control his defence.‖ Id. at paras. 50–56.   The court 
then rejected a higher standard of fitness that includes a ―best interests‖ component because it would 
derogate ―from the fundamental principle that an accused is entitled to choose his own defence and to 
present it as he chooses.‖ Id. at para. 53. 
183
 Id. at para. 66. 
184
 Id. at para. 63. 
185
 Id. at para. 66.  ―He cannot demand the right to represent himself and at the same time demand the right 
to effective assistance of counsel.  Having decided to represent himself he must live with the consequences 
and cannot later complain that his conduct of the trial did not reach the level of a competent lawyer.‖  Id.; 
see also R. v. Gordon, 2003 CanLII 17221 (Can. Ont. C.A.) (noting that cases dealing with ineffective 
assistance of counsel have no application to cases in which a defendant represents himself); R. v. 
Romanowicz, 1999 CanLII 1315 (Can. Ont. C.A.) (noting that respect for individual autonomy in the 
adversarial system requires that no person can be compelled to be represented, but the self-represented 
accused then assumes the risks and disadvantages of appearing without counsel); see also R. v. Fabrikant, 
1995 CanLII 5384 (Can. Q.C. C.A.) (noting that accused who chooses to self-represent enjoys no special 
privileges and gains no special right to proceed by different fundamental rules by renouncing the right to 
assistance of counsel).  The rule in the United States is the same.  See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 
834 n.46 (1975) (―[A] defendant who elects to represent himself cannot thereafter complain that the quality 
of his own defense amounted to a denial of ‗effective assistance of counsel.‘‖). 
186
 R. v. Peepeetch, (2003) 238 Sask. R. 14, para. 69.  The trial judge had ―carefully explained the law and 
procedures‖ to the defendant; provided him with counsel (against his wishes) ―to assist him in identifying 
relevant issues,‖ directed that ―prospective jurors should be questioned‖ regarding possible bias against 
aboriginals; ―repeatedly explained the purpose of cross-examination,‖ and ordered the defendant be given 
written instructions regarding the manner of conducting cross-examination; ―explained the burden of 
proof,‖ and ordered that defendant ―be given an up-to-date copy of the Criminal Code;‖ explained ―the 
normal conduct of a defence‖ after the Crown rested its case against him; adjourned the proceedings to 
allow him sufficient time to review his notes or the evidence or to order production of requested transcripts; 
assisted defendant in making sure all defense witnesses he wished to call were present to testify; called an 
expert for the defendant on the effects of alcohol and drugs after ordering the expert to attend the trial and 
gain a full understanding of the facts of the case; offered ―advocacy tips and tactical advice‖; explained the 
purpose of voir dire; and engaged in a ―tactical discussion‖ concerning the relative advantages and 
disadvantages of addressing the jury last.  Id.  at paras. 69–71. 
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placed before the jury.  In this respect he complied with the duty of a trial judge faced 
with these difficult circumstances . . . .‖187  
¶71 Another example of the Canadian approach to ascertaining capacity to self-
represent is R. v. B.K.S.,
188
 which, like Peepeetch, involved a self-represented defendant‘s 
claim on appeal of insufficient judicial assistance by the trial judge.  In B.K.S., the 
defendant, an accused rapist, was not a ―gray-area‖ defendant, as he was found by two 
psychiatrists and the court to be fit to stand trial.
189
  But, after insisting on representing 
himself and being convicted, he appealed on grounds, inter alia, that the trial court erred 
in permitting him to represent himself.
190
  The British Columbia Court of Appeal found 
the capacity finding was not in error, noting that ―it is not a prerequisite‖ for a fitness 
finding that the defendant ―be capable of exercising analytical reasoning in making a 
choice to accept the advice of counsel, or in coming to a decision that best serves her 
interests.‖191  The question is, ―Did the accused possess an operating mind.  It goes no 
further and no inquiry is necessary as to whether the accused is capable of making a 
good or wise choice or one that is in his or her interest.‖192   
                                                 
187
 Id. at para. 73.  Given the general rule of non-assistance with which they are familiar, American jurists 
would probably say that the trial judge in Peepeetch did indeed ―descend from the bench‖ and become the 
defendant‘s advocate.  Canadian judges, in contrast, see these accommodations as the means of ensuring a 
fair trial.   
188
 R. v. B.K.S. 1998 CanLII 14980 (Can. B.C. C.A.).  
189




 Id. at para. 19 (citing R. v. Whittle, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 914 (Can.)). 
192
 Id. (emphasis added) (emphasis omitted).  The court noted that the trial judge had assisted the defendant 
in the following ways: 
 ‗[O]bjecting‘ to Crown counsel questioning the complainant about occasions 
where she had disclosed to others the assaults upon her by the appellant out of concern 
that inadmissible recent complaint evidence would be led; ascertaining from Crown 
counsel that the allegations of misconduct, both past and present, by the appellant 
towards his sisters other than the complainant was ‗something [the trial judge] should not 
be hearing about‘ and that the trial judge would ignore any such reference in the 
evidence;  
canvassing with the appellant whether he wished to cross-examine the complainant and 
then explaining to the complainant that he will give the appellant a chance t o do so at a 
later time which would necessitate her being recalled should the need arise;  
 advising the appellant that he will have an opportunity to cross-examine his other sisters; 
‗objecting‘ to Crown counsel eliciting hearsay evidence from S.S.;  
inviting the appellant to cross-examine his sister, S.S.;  
‗objecting‘ to Crown counsel asking R.S. about sexual abuse she suffered at the hands of 
her other brothers;  
explaining the amendment to the information, confirming his satisfaction that the 
appellant has a defence  to give, explaining how the appellant can testify if he chooses to, 
that the appellant has the  right to remain silent and need not testify, that by doing so he 
will expose himself to cross-examination;  
conducting the direct examination of the appellant, eliciting both general and specific 
denials to the Crown's allegations;  
giving the appellant advice on dealing with cross-examination;  
ensuring that the Crown's cross-examination of the appellant on his criminal record is 
proper;  
not permitting Crown counsel to cross-examine the appellant on his unsworn statements 
made the previous day;  
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¶72 The foregoing Canadian authorities recognize that the right to self-representation 
rests on the defendant‘s interest in his dignity and autonomy before the law, and balance 
these against the judge‘s duty to assure a process that is both fair in appearance and in 
fact.  The defendant‘s dignity and autonomy trumped the state‘s interest in avoiding a 
―spectacle,‖ that is, an appearance of unfairness, because fairness was considered from 
the defendant‘s perspective, reflecting a greater concern for fairness in fact.  Despite the 
defendants‘ ―gray-area‖ mental competency and lack of legal skill and knowledge in the 
Canadian cases, the courts create conditions fulfilling ―gray-area‖ defendants‘ rights to 
dignity and autonomy by the use of various forms of reasonable judicial assistance.  
3. International Court Usage 
¶73 Human rights to dignity and autonomy are fundamental not only in Western 
philosophy and adversarial justice systems.  Numerous international and regional 
conventions recognize the right of self-representation, as do the charters of every 
international criminal tribunal.  Such widespread recognition of the rights to dignity and 
autonomy makes these rights part of customary international law.
193
    
¶74 The Charter of the United Nations provides in its Preamble that the ―Peoples of the 
United Nations‖ were, in creating the U.N., determined ―to reaffirm faith in fundamental 
human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men 
and women and of nations large and small.‖194  The Preamble of the U.N. Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (Declaration) states: ―Recognition of the inherent dignity 
and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the 
foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.‖ 195  The Declaration also creates 
a right to recognition as a ―person before the law,‖196 and a right to an ―effective remedy‖ 
                                                                                                                                                 
reminding the appellant that he will have an opportunity to add anything he may have 
forgotten to say in evidence;  
giving the appellant a chance to do exactly that;  
asking the appellant if he has any other witnesses to call and explaining how the appellant 
has an opportunity to make a closing argument;  
asking Crown counsel to assess the evidence objectively; and giving the appellant a final 
opportunity to make submissions. 
 The trial judge extended an appropriate amount of assistance in this case. To contend, as 
the appellant does, that the trial judge should have cross-examined the Crown witnesses 
for him effectively requires the trial judge to become an advocate for an unrepresented 
accused. To do so, clearly extends beyond offering assistance and ensuring that a fair trial 
is held[,] duties which, in my opinion, the trial judge properly discharged in these 
circumstances. 
Id. at paras. 27–28.  B.K.S. and Peepeetch each illustrate the breadth of what Canadian courts consider 
reasonable judicial assistance that does not cross the line into advocacy. 
193
 ―[W]here there is no treaty and no controlling or executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort 
must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations . . . .‖  The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 
(1900). 
194
 U.N. Charter preamble, available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/preamble.shtml. 
195
 G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (Dec. 10, 1948), available at  
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/ [hereinafter Universal Declaration of Human Rights]; see generally 
Haim H. Cohn, On the Meaning of Human Dignity in 13 ISR. YEARBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS 226, 226–51 
(1983) (discussing human dignity in international instruments). 
196
 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 195, at art. 6.  
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for acts violating the ―fundamental rights‖ granted every person by the constitution or by 
law.
197
   
¶75 International protection of the rights to dignity and autonomy is also reflected in the 
recognition of the right to self-representation in the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR).
198
 The same or similar language in the ICCPR appears in the 
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
199
 the Statute 
of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,
200
 the Statute of the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone,
201
 and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.
202
 No 
international tribunal, however, has yet faced the autonomy-fair trial issue in the case of a 
―gray-area‖ pro se defendant.  
                                                 
197
 Id. at art. 8. 
198
 Giving the accused the right to: 
[D]efend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing; to be 
informed, if he does not have legal assistance, of this right; and to have legal assistance 
assigned to him, in any case where the interests of justice so require, and without 
payment by him in any such case if he does not have sufficient means to pay for it. 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 14(3)(d), Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
199
 Giving the accused the right: 
[T]o defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing; to be 
informed, if he does not have legal assistance, of this right; and to have legal assistance 
assigned to him, in any case where the interests of justice so require, and without 
payment by him in any such case if he does not have sufficient means to pay for it. 
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia art. 21(4)(d), May 25, 1993, 32 
I.L.M. 1192 [hereinafter ICTY]. 
In the case of the late Slobodan Milosevic, on trial for crimes against humanity, the defendant 
himself provided the tribunal with a copy of the U.S. Supreme Court‘s decision in Faretta as he argued 
against the compelled imposition of counsel.  Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. 
for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 11, 2002), available at   
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/slobodan_milosevic/trans/en/021111ED.htm.  There are other cases of pro se 
defendants in the ICTY.  See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Krajisnik, Case No. IT-00-39 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia June 3, 2005), available at  
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/krajisnik/trans/en/050603IT.htm; Prosecutor v. Seselj, Case No. IT-03-67-PT, 
Decision on Prosecution‘s Motion for Order Appointing Counsel to Assist Vojislav Seselj with his Defence 
(Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 9, 2003), available at 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/seselj/tdec/en/030509.htm.  
200
 Giving the accused the right: 
[T]o defend himself or herself in person or through legal assistance of his or her own 
choosing; to be informed, if he or she does not have legal assistance, of this right; and to 
have legal assistance assigned to him or her, in any case where the interests of justice so 
require, and without payment by him or her in any such case if he or she does not have 
sufficient means to pay for it. 
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda art. 20(4)(d), Nov. 8, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1602. 
201
 Giving the accused the right: 
[T]to defend himself or herself in person or through legal assistance of his or her own 
choosing; to be informed, if he or she does not have legal assistance, of this right; and to 
have legal assistance assigned to him or her, in any case where the interests of justice so 
require, and without payment by him or her in any such case if he or she does not have 
sufficient means to pay for it. 
Rome Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone art. 17(4)(d), Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 145. 
202
 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter ICC] 
(giving the accused the right ―to conduct the defence  in person or through legal assistance of the accused‘s 
choosing, . . . and to have legal assistance assigned by the Court in any case where the interests of justice so 
require‖).   
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¶76 This review of dignity, autonomy, and personhood in philosophy and the law in the 
United States, Canada, and international law establishes the highest importance of these 
rights.  They are beyond fundamental; they are foundational to self-government and 
justice under the rule of law.  Given the prominence of human dignity in international law 
and Western philosophy and its support for the right to self-representation, is it enough to 
acknowledge that a self-representation right exists, as the Supreme Court did in Faretta v. 
California?  Or do courts have an obligation to ensure that self-representation is not 
merely a hollow right by affirmatively providing the conditions for the flourishing of 
dignity and autonomy in the justice system?   
IV. THE STATE‘S OBLIGATION TO CREATE CONDITIONS FOR FULFILLMENT OF DIGNITY 
AND AUTONOMY 
¶77 Given the foundational significance of autonomy of the individual, it should have 
trumped the state‘s interest in Edwards in avoiding the appearance of a ―spectacle.‖  To 
give greater weight to the court‘s image and institutional legitimacy than the ―gray-area‖ 
pro se defendant‘s rights to autonomy and dignity negates the freedom of the individual 
and his right to present his own defense that the Founders and the majority in Faretta 
sought to protect.  Furthermore, the decision in Edwards reflects the Court‘s elevation of 
the older meaning of dignity, which referred to high social standing, as in the ―dignity of 
the court,‖203 over the modern meaning referring to the essence of being human and a 
person before the law.   
¶78 Moreover, contrary to the Kantian principles discussed above,204 it is not difficult 
to imagine the defendant feeling that he was being used as a means to the court‘s end of 
ensuring its own view of fairness.
205
  The Edwards majority, by permitting the imposition 
of unwanted counsel, was therefore not guaranteeing to the defendant real autonomy, but 
rather was protecting his apparent autonomy from the perspective of court observers.  In 
so doing, the Court improperly used the defendant to protect its own institutional 
legitimacy.    
¶79 Rather than imposing unwanted counsel, the justice system needs to provide or 
permit alternative forms of assistance to pro se defendants.  Surely the fairness in the 
appearance of a trial in which an individual assists the ―gray-area‖ defendant in making 
his or her defense is greater than that of a  trial in which a defendant repeatedly objects to 
unwanted counsel.  The court itself in Faretta noted that ―unwanted counsel ‗represents‘ 
the defendant only through a tenuous and unacceptable legal fiction.
206
  Unless the 
                                                 
203
 See supra note 161 and accompanying text. 
204
 See supra notes 119–127 and accompanying text. 
205
 Ironically, the court in Faretta, in enumerating some limitations upon the right to self-representation, 
noted that a pro se defendant has no right "to abuse the dignity of the courtroom."  Faretta v. California, 
422 U.S. 806, 834 n.46 (1975).  This use of dignity, which is more closely tied to the original conception 
referring to high social standing, shows how two different conceptions of dignity (i.e., the dignity of the 
tribunal versus the personal dignity of the defendant) came in direct conflict in the same case, and Edwards 
shows how the Court‘s dated conception trumped the modern conception focusing on the dignity and 
autonomy necessary for self-government and the rule of law.  Indiana v. Edwards, 544 U.S. 164 (2008). 
206
 Faretta, 422 U.S. at 821. 
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accused has acquiesced in such representation, the defense presented is not the defense 
guaranteed him by the Constitution, for, in every real sense, it is not his defense.‖207    
¶80 Autonomy is in effect an elaboration of a view of human nature, one version of 
which is the view of psychologists that humans possess a ―central tendency to grow‖ and 
reach ―competence.‖208  As Professor Haworth argues, autonomy is ―arrived at as the 
outcome of a developmental process.  Being natural, its development depends on the 
presence of nurturing conditions.  The fact that our world makes achievement of 
autonomy of action a struggle implies that these nurturing conditions are not present in 
sufficient numbers, or that they are neutralized by other conditions that inhibit 
autonomy.‖209  Since autonomy is natural, it needn‘t be taught; people ―need only an 
environment that offers facilitating, nurturing conditions and that lacks autonomy-
inhibiting conditions.‖210  In the context of gray-area pro se defendants, I argue that it is 
the state‘s obligation to provide alternative forms of assistance to establish these 
―nurturing conditions,‖ which will enhance these defendants‘ competence and autonomy 
at trial.  Likewise, pro se defendants need legal knowledge and other information and 
assistance in order to ensure their freedom to choose self-representation and carry it out 
in their own way.  
¶81 Professor Gewirth sought to establish that ―[t]he necessary conditions of human 
action provide the justifying grounds for the universal ascription of human dignity, and 
this in turn serves to justify the principle of human rights.‖211  His reference to the 
necessary conditions of human action refers to two ―generic features‖ of all actions: (1) 
freedom or voluntariness, and (2) well-being, which together constitute what he views as 
the ―procedural‖ and ―substantive necessary conditions of action.‖212  He defines freedom 
as ―controlling one‘s behavior by one‘s unforced choice while having knowledge of 
relevant circumstances.‖213  Well-being is ―having the abilities and conditions needed for 
fulfilling one‘s various purposes.‖214 
¶82 Professor Haworth, like Gewirth, argues that certain conditions are necessary in 
order to be fully autonomous: 
Since a certain level of education and health is necessary if one is 
to become able to live autonomously, one also has autonomy-based rights 
to access the complex institutional arrangements set up to provide the 




 AUTONOMY , supra note 117, at 2. 
209
 Id. at 8; see also Partridge, supra note 102, at 224 (―[W]e cannot truly be said to be free to choose some 
preferred alternative unless we have the means or the power to achieve it, and thus the absence of means or 
power to do X is equivalent to absence of freedom to do it.‖). 
210
 Id. at 189; see also Paust, supra note 137, at 2 (―[A] person strives to become able to produce intended 
effects, and to expand the repertoire of skills that underlies that ability.  Competence is the foundation of 
autonomy.‖).  
211
 Gewirth, supra note 116, at 28.   
212
 Id. at 19. 
213
 Id.  
214
 Id. at 20.  Well-being on Gewirth‘s account requires three kinds of action-related goods:  ―(1) general 
preconditions (life and physical integrity); (2) undiminished retention of one‘s purpose fulfillment and 
one‘s capability for practical action, such as the non-subtractive well-being of not being lied to, stolen 
from, etc.; and (3) increasing one‘s level of purpose fulfillment and one‘s capabilities for particular actions 
in the additive sense of being able to acquire an education, opportunities for wealth and income, etc.‖  Id.   
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means to acquire education and health . . . [T]he legal rights grouped 
under the heading of due process of law identify modes of treatment that 
are necessary to ensure that one‘s domain for autonomy will be open.  The 
rights to education, to health, and to due process of law are, then, positive 
autonomy-based rights.
215
   
¶83 Likewise, Professor Joseph Raz has written:  
All that has to be accepted is that to be autonomous a person must not only 
be given a choice but he must be given an adequate range of choices.  A 
person whose every decision is extracted from him by coercion is not an 
autonomous person.  Nor is a person autonomous if he is paralyzed and 
therefore cannot take advantage of the options which are offered to him.
216
 
¶84 The metaphor of being in ―paralysis‖ figuratively fits the situation of the typical 
pro se defendant. Thus, autonomy alone is insufficient.  Realization or actualization of 
autonomy requires additional necessary conditions that the state has a duty to provide if 
autonomy is to play any significant role in our justice system.  Otherwise there really is 
no autonomy or personhood before the law.   
¶85 The foundational right to autonomy (inclusive of dignity and personhood before the 
law) in the context of self-representation has two dimensions.  The state must, first, 
recognize the right to self-representation.  Second, the state must ensure that courts make 
the first obligation a reality in fact, and not merely in appearance.  In order to meet the 
second dimension of autonomy, courts must create conditions under which the right to 
self-representation can be effectively fulfilled.  A ―gray-area‖ defendant‘s insistence on 
self-representation is a quintessential exercise of the Constitutional rights to dignity and 
autonomy. But if the request is granted in the absence of the defendant having the 
competence for meaningful self-representation, then the court has merely recognized a 
hollow right.   
¶86 The second dimension of autonomy requires that the individual have knowledge of 
relevant circumstances, some minimal level of competence, and an adequate set of 
options.  These philosophical notions are nothing more than the right to a ―meaningful 
hearing‖ already protected by the Due Process Clause, but they are currently lacking in 
the case of American ―gray-area‖ pro se defendants.  The competence required by such 
defendants should be reflected in a range of instruction, information, and assistance given 
with the goal of providing these defendants with a fair opportunity to present their chosen 
defense.  The means of ensuring the required competence cannot exist if judicial and  
alternative forms of assistance are prohibited. 
V. INNOVATIVE FORMS OF PRO SE ASSISTANCE AND REPRESENTATION 
¶87 At common law, not only was there no right to the assistance of counsel in criminal 
cases, but representation by counsel was prohibited.
217
  Blackstone noted, however, that 
                                                 
215
 AUTONOMY, supra note 117, at 214. 
216
 JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 373 (1986). 
217
 DAVID HUTCHISON, THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION 312–13 (1975) (quoting WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 356).   
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some judges allowed counsel to instruct a defendant as to ―what questions to ask or even 
to ask questions for him . . .‖218  This early practice demonstrates that the judicial 
allowance of assistance for pro se criminal defendants even preceded the right to counsel, 
as it is interpreted today.
219
 
¶88 In recognizing the right of self-representation in Faretta v. California, the Supreme 
Court held that ―[t]o thrust counsel upon the accused, against his considered wish, thus 
violates the logic of the [Sixth] Amendment. In such a case, counsel is not an assistant, 
but a master . . . .‖220  The footnote following that statement reminds the reader: 
Such a result would sever the concept of counsel from its historic 
roots. The first lawyers were personal friends of the litigant, brought into 
court by him so that he might ‗take ―counsel‖ with them‘ before pleading. 
. . . Similarly, the first ‗attorneys' were personal agents, often lacking any 
professional training, who were appointed by those litigants who had 




¶89 Moreover, the Supreme Court in Indiana v. Edwards was concerned for the first 
time with the perception of the fairness of an unrepresented criminal defendant with an 
unstable mental condition and with no legal skill or knowledge presenting his defense, 
prompting the majority to authorize imposed counsel.
222
  Surely, trials would have a 
greater appearance of fairness if courts provided reasonable judicial or other assistance 
short of appointment of unwanted counsel to ―gray-area‖ defendants while maintaining 
their impartiality.
223
   
¶90 Previous bench and bar resistance to judicial assistance and the growth of non-
lawyer practitioners—regulated or otherwise—does not create a favorable atmosphere for 
proposals of assistance for ―gray-area‖ defendants.224  Nevertheless, I argue that courts‘ 
legitimacy is better served by establishing what Professor Haworth called ―nurturing 
conditions,‖ which increase defendants‘ competence to represent themselves.225  Courts 
should consider implementation of the following forms of innovative assistance to meet 
that objective. 
                                                 
218
 Id. at 313. 
219
 The Sixth Amendment itself guarantees the right to ―the assistance of counsel.‖  U.S. CONST. amend. 
VI.  
220
 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 820 (1975). 
221
 Id. at n.16 (citation omitted). 
222
 See infra Part II.A.  The similar concerns exist in the context of self-represented litigants in the civil 
context, but the Supreme Court has not yet addressed this issue. 
223
 To provide ―gray-area‖ defendants with alternative forms of assistance short of full representation would 
also reflect society‘s empathy and compassion for such individuals.  Some might even argue that the state 
is required to provide them with these assistance alternatives as ―reasonable accommodations‖ to which 
they are due under the American with Disabilities Act 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq (1990), a subject for future 
research.  
224
 Jona Goldschmidt, The Pro Se Litigant’s Struggle for Access to Justice: Meeting the Challenge of Bench 
and Bar Resistance, 40 FAM. CT. REV. 36, 48–51 (2002) (arguing for an expanded judicial role, to include 
providing reasonable assistance to pro se litigants). 
225
 See supra notes 203–205 and accompanying text.   
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A. Judicial Assistance 
¶91 Canadian law and practice demonstrate that much can be done to recognize and 
protect the dignity and autonomy of ―gray-area‖ defendants.  First, judges have a duty to 
provide reasonable assistance to self-represented defendants.  As noted by the Ontario 
Court of Appeal in R. v. McGibbon: 
Consistent with the duty to ensure that the accused has a fair trial, the trial 
judge is required within reason to provide assistance to the unrepresented 
accused, to aid him in the proper conduct of his defence, and to guide him 
throughout the trial in such a way that his defence is brought out with its 
full force and effect. How far the trial judge should go in assisting the 
accused . . . must of necessity be a matter of discretion.
226
 
¶92 Moreover, in R v. Romanowicz, the court held: 
Throughout the trial of an unrepresented accused, the court is obliged to 
assist the accused in presenting his or her defence. . . without 
compromising the court's impartiality. . . .  In rendering assistance to the 
accused, the court is obliged to take into account the totality of the 
circumstances, including the sophistication of the accused, the gravity of 
the offence charged, the nature of the defence and the complexity of the 
issues at hand. At the end of the day, however, the unrepresented accused 
has the right to make strategic decisions and to defend himself or herself at 




                                                 
226
 R. v. McGibbon, (1988), 431 O.A.C. 10 (Can. Ont. C.A.).  A number of cases have recognized the duty 
of reasonable assistance as a corollary of the duty to ensure fairness.  See, e.g., R. v. Tran (2001), 55 O.R. 
3d 161 (Can. Ont. C.A.); R. v. Travers (2001), 193 N.S.R. 2d 263, (Can. N.S. C.A.); R. v. Dimmock, 1996 
CarswellBC 524, (Can. B.C. C.A.) (WL); R. v. Turlon, (1989), 32 O.A.C. 396, (Can. Ont. C.A.); R. v. 
Taubler (1987), 20 O.A.C. 64, 71 (Can. Ont. C.A.); R. v. Littlejohn, 1978 CarswellOnt 1201 (Can. Ont. 
C.A.)(WL). 
Canadian courts have overturned convictions where courts gave insufficient assistance to pro se 
defendants.  See R. v. Jones [1994], 154 A.R. 118 (Can. Alta. Q.B.) (reversing a self-represented 
defendant‘s conviction where the trial judge gave the defendant no information about the trial process, 
failed to inform her of her right to call witnesses or seek an adjournment if they failed to appear, and failed 
to inform her of what issues were relevant in her cross-examination of Crown witnesses).    
227
 R. v. Romanowicz, 1998 CanLII 14957, para 34 (Can. ON S.C.) (citations omitted).  It should be noted 
that reasonable accommodations is distinguishable from other forms of assistance involving active judicial 
involvement.  For example, in R. v. Chemama, the court—in addition to appointing an amicus curiae—
ordered the following accommodations be given to the ―gray area‖ pro se defendant, who had attention—
deficit disorder and learning disabilities: 
 [Defendant] will be afforded accommodations to meet his special needs. All the 
participants in this trial will exercise particular patience and consideration. If necessary, 
questions and answers will be repeated.  If he wishes, Mr. Chemama will be permitted to 
audio-record the proceedings and have use of a computer in the courtroom. Trial dates 
will be separated, rather than continuous, to allow Mr. Chemama an opportunity to digest 
the testimony of witnesses and prepare for the next hearing date.  And a court-ordered 
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¶93 The Canadian authorities thus recognize the same need for judicial neutrality as 
American courts, but also recognize that the dignity and autonomy of the unrepresented 
individual require some form of affirmative assistance.  It is true that some pragmatic 
American judges provide some assistance to pro se defendants to avoid harsh results, but 
these efforts are not enough.  A judicial duty of reasonable assistance should be created 
through case law, judicial ethics principles, or court rules.  If one accepts the axiom that 
justice should be uniform, then allowing judges to assist pro se defendants as a 
discretionary matter, without guidelines, will mean that access to justice will vary by 
individual judge.
228
  To require that ―gray-area‖ pro se defendants—or, for that matter, all 
pro se defendants—be given reasonable judicial assistance will maximize access to 
justice for both those who are literate but simply lack information and need guidance, and 
those who for various reasons lack the competence to present their own claim or defense 
and would not otherwise be able to do so but for some form of assistance.  The justice 
system‘s goal of not only being fair, but appearing to be fair, will not be met under the 
existing same-rules and no-assistance doctrines.
229
  
B. Duty Counsel  
¶94 ―Duty counsel‖ refers to private bar association, pro bono, or legal services lawyers 
who are available in many Canadian criminal, family, landlord-tenant, and mental health 
courts on a daily basis to consult with pro se litigants.
230
 In Ontario, the services of duty 
counsel are described as providing legal advice; assisting in settlement negotiations; 
reviewing court documents; assisting in short court hearings; explaining court 




                                                                                                                                                 
copy of the transcript of the proceedings of each day of trial will be provided to Mr. 
Chemama at the official copy rate.  
2008 ONCJ 31, para. 33 (Can. Ont. C.J.). 
228
  
Consistency between courtrooms is essential to the legitimacy of any system of justice. 
 . . .  If in one courtroom the judge takes greater control over the proceedings and ensures 
the admission of probative evidence, and in another courtroom the judge refuses to 
relinquish his role as a detached and neutral arbiter, the result will be inconsistency.  
Thus, courts need procedures to ensure that trials of pro se defendants are consistent 
among different courts. 
Sharon Finegan, Pro Se Criminal Trials and the Merging of Inquisitorial and Adversarial Systems of 
Justice, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 445, 494 (2009) (advocating the borrowing of inquisitorial justice system 
methods for pro se criminal cases in order to balance the defendant‘s autonomy interest with the court‘s 
duty to ensure fairness). 
229
 See infra Part II.C.  
230
 See generally Gord MacDonald & Helena Brit, Duty Counsel and the Self-Represented Litigant, 19 
CAN. FAM. L.Q. 497 (2001). 
231
 One online description of the assistance provided by duty counsel states.  
Family duty counsel are private bar or Legal Aid Ontario staff lawyers who can: 
 Give advice about legal rights, obligations and the court process  
 Help negotiate and settle issues  
 Review or prepare court documents to be filed 
provide assistance in: 
the courtroom for child protection hearings 
garnishment and support hearings  
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¶95 The duty counsel program ―ensures that anyone involved in a court matter receives 
legal advice.‖232  A 2002 evaluation of the family law duty counsel program of the 
Ontario Legal Aid agency found that there was a ―strong need‖ for duty counsel services, 
a ―high level of support for the expanded duty counsel model among clients and 
stakeholders,‖ and ―a strong rationale for continued implementation of expanded duty 
counsel services across the province.‖233 
¶96 While there are some American jurisdictions with similar programs,234 courts and 
pro se defendants would benefit from adopting the duty counsel model on a broad basis, 
                                                                                                                                                 
requesting adjournments  
arguing motions  
hearings for issues such as custody, access, or support where the issues 
are not complicated 
Legal Aid Ontario, Getting Legal Help in the Courtroom: Criminal Duty Counsel: Family Duty Counsel, 
http://www.legalaid.on.ca/en/getting/dutycounsel_family.asp.  Likewise, the online brochure describes 
criminal duty counsel: ―Criminal duty counsel are private bar or Legal Aid Ontario staff lawyers who can: 
give advice about legal rights, obligations and the court process[;] provide assistance in the courtroom for 
bail hearings and sentencing[;] assist with diversion, guilty pleas and adjournments[.]‖  Legal Aid Ontario, 
Getting Legal Help in the Courtroom: Criminal Duty Counsel, 
http://www.legalaid.on.ca/en/getting/dutycounsel_criminal.asp.  The online brochure describes tenant duty 
counsel: ―Tenant duty counsel may: give advice about legal rights, obligations and the tribunal process[;] 
review documents[;] provide referrals for other services.‖  Legal Aid Ontario, Getting Legal Help in the 
Courtroom, http://www.legalaid.on.ca/en/getting/dutycounsel_tenant.asp.  The online brochure describes 
mental health duty counsel: 
People appearing in mental health court on a criminal matter without a lawyer are 
generally assisted by duty counsel at their first appearance. After the first appearance, 
people who cannot apply for legal aid on their own can receive help in one of the 
following ways: Through a lawyer or criminal duty counsel . . . With a legal aid 
representative or a Patient Advocate/Rights Advisor. 
Legal Aid Ontario, Getting Legal Help in the Courtroom: Mental Health Duty Counsel, 
http://www.legalaid.on.ca/en/getting/dutycounsel_mentalhealth.asp.  
232
 Natalie Fraser, Canadian Duty Counsel, CANADIAN-LAWYERS.CA, http://www.canadian-
lawyers.ca/Home/Legal%20Help%20and%20Resources/Canadian%20Duty%20Counsel.aspx. 
233
 PRA, INC., EVALUATION OF THE FAMILY LAW EXPANDED DUTY COUNSEL PILOT PROJECTS: FINAL 
REPORT ii–iii (2002), available at 
http://www.legalaid.on.ca/en/publications/downloads/report_EDCevaluation_02oct.pdf.  The reference to 
―expanded‖ duty counsel refers to the goals of: 
advancing cases toward resolution . . .[wherein]  duty counsel spend time and effort on 
behalf of clients in an attempt to assist them in bringing closure to their matter or major 
elements of their matter.  The expanded duty counsel model, therefore, has three 
important features that distinguish it from the traditional model and that are intended to 
enable the model to pursue this central principle: the capacity to create and carry client 
files; the ability to provide continuity of representation; and the capacity to draft court 
documents. 
Summary of Reform: Legal Aid Ontario Family Law Expanded Duty Counsel, CANADIAN FORUM ON CIVIL 
JUSTICE, http://cfcj-fcjc.org/inventory/reform.php?id=59.   
234
 For instance, in Plymouth, Massachusetts, the local bar administers a ―Lawyer of the Day‖ program 
using volunteer attorneys willing to advise indigent self-represented litigants.  Lawyer of the Day Program, 
PLYMOUTH COUNTY PROB. & FAM. CT., http://pcpfc.com/lawyer_of_the_day_program.htm; see also 
Courtroom Lawyer for the Day in Suffolk Probate and Family Court, VOLUNTEER LAWS. PROJECT OF 
BOSTON BAR ASS‘N, http://www.vlpnet.org/volunteer/item.718-
Courtroom_Lawyer_for_the_Day_in_Suffolk_Probate_Family_Court; Volunteer Lawyer for the Day 
Program Prospective Volunteers, New York State Unified Ct. Sys., 
http://www.nycourts.gov/courts/nyc/housing/vlfd_hsg_prospectiveattys.shtml. 
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as this would provide pro se litigants with a modicum of legal assistance at important 
stages of criminal (and civil) legal proceedings.  Additional reforms by way of statutory 
or court rule changes may be needed to implement programs that permit such daily 
counsel to impart legal assistance, as contrasted to legal information.
235
  
C. Hybrid Representation 
¶97 A standby counsel (sometimes known as ―advisory counsel‖) is appointed by 
American and Canadian courts to assist self-represented defendants in serious criminal 
cases, especially capital cases.
236
  They may assist a pro se defendant ―in overcoming 
routine procedural or evidentiary obstacles‖ and may also help to ―ensure the defendant‘s 
compliance with basic rules of courtroom protocol and procedure.‖237  The defendant, 
however, retains control over the organization and content of his defense, files his own 
motions, makes his own arguments, participates in voir dire, and questions witnesses.
238
  




¶98 In contrast to standby counsel, whose unique duties are delineated by the trial court 
in each case,
240
 ―hybrid representation‖ is an arrangement in which a self-represented 
                                                 
235
 Additionally, some form of immunity from malpractice suits (with exceptions for gross negligence or 
recklessness) should be adopted to protect counsel who provide legal services or other assistance under this 
delivery model. 
236
 A court may, ―even over objection by the accused—appoint a ‗standby counsel‘ to aid the accused if and 
when the accused requests help, and to be available to represent the accused in the event that termination of 
the defendant‘s self-representation is necessary.‖  Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 n. 46 (1975).  
Some courts only permit standby counsel in capital cases.  See People v. Garcia, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 796, 802 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2000).  
237
 McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 183 (1984). 
238
 In McKaskle, the Court stated:   
  First, the pro se defendant is entitled to preserve actual control over the case he chooses 
to present to the jury. This is the core of the Faretta right. If standby counsel's participation over 
the defendant's objection effectively allows counsel to make or substantially interfere with any 
significant tactical decisions, or to control the questioning of witnesses, or to speak instead of the 
defendant on any matter of importance, the Faretta right is eroded. 
  Second, participation by standby counsel without the defendant's consent should not be 
allowed to destroy the jury's perception that the defendant is representing himself.  The defendant's 
appearance in the status of one conducting his own defense is important in a criminal trial, since 
the right to appear pro se exists to affirm the accused's individual dignity and autonomy. . . .  
Appearing before the jury in the status of one who is defending himself may be equally important 
to the pro se defendant.  From the jury's perspective, the message conveyed by the defense may 
depend as much on the messenger as on the message itself. From the defendant's own point of 
view, the right to appear pro se can lose much of its importance if only the lawyers in the 
courtroom know that the right is being exercised.  
Id. at 178–79 (footnote omitted).   
239
 Christine G. Jennings, Comment: Kaczynski to Moussaoui: Allowing Pro Se Defendants with Mental 
Illnesses to Represent Themselves, 31 N.E. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 365 (arguing that standby 
counsel is particularly appropriate in cases of defendants with limited mental capacity). 
240
 See, e.g., State v. Powers, 563 S.E.2d 781, 788 (W. Va. 2001):  
 Given the lack of clarity over what, exactly, is the role of standby counsel, we find it is of the 
utmost importance that, when appointing standby counsel, trial courts do in fact define, precisely, 
the role counsel is expected to assume. Furthermore, trial courts should clearly inform counsel and 
the defendant of that role. Accordingly, we hold that when a circuit court appoints standby counsel 
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defendant requests only specific, limited legal services from counsel, and thereby acts 
essentially as co-counsel with the attorney.  The hybrid relationship may involve, for 
example, the pro se defendant wanting to conduct the opening statement and closing 
argument, and having counsel conduct the questioning of the witnesses, or some other 
division of labor during the trial or pretrial process.   
¶99 The hybrid model of representation has almost uniformly been rejected by 
American courts.
241
  One court explained the objection as follows:  
As we have noted, the right to counsel and the right to defend pro se 
cannot be asserted simultaneously. The two rights are disjunctive. There 
can be but one captain of the ship, and it is he alone who must assume 
responsibility for its passage, whether it safely reaches the destination 
charted or founders on a reef.
242
 
¶100 While commentators have discussed the advantages of hybrid representation,243 
only a minority of courts have held that it is within the discretion of the trial judge to 
permit hybrid representation.
244
  It is rare for a court to find that denial of hybrid counsel 
                                                                                                                                                 
to assist a criminal defendant who has been permitted to proceed pro se, the circuit court must, on 
the record at the time of the appointment, advise both counsel and the defendant of the specific 
duties standby counsel should be prepared to perform. For example, the court must state whether 
counsel should be prepared to take over the case at the defendant's request. 
241
 See, e.g., McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 178; United States v. Washington, 353 F.3d 42, 46 (D.C. Cir. 2004) 
(defendant's request to present own closing argument properly denied because defendant does not have 
right to hybrid representation); McCulloch v. Velez, 364 F. 3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2004) (noting that there is no 
right to hybrid representation in federal courts); State v. Cook, 821 P.2d 731, 739 (Ariz. 1991)  (noting that 
―Arizona does not recognize the right to hybrid representation‖); In re Lee Max Barnett, 73 P.3d 1106, 
1111 (Cal. 2003) (ordering that the court will no longer consider pro se petitions from represented criminal 
defendants); In re Sondley, Sr., 990 S.W.2d 361, 362 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999) (―[A] trial court is under no 
mandatory duty to accept or consider pleadings filed pro se by a party who is represented by counsel.‖).    
242
 Parren v. State, 523 A.2d 597, 599 (Md. 1987). 
243
 See, e.g., Joseph A. Colquitt, Hybrid Representation: Standing the Two-Sided Coin on Its Edge, 38 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 55, 65 (2003); Judith Welcom, Assistance of Counsel: A Right to Hybrid 
Representation, 57 B.U.L. REV. 570, 571 (1977); Richard H. Chused, Faretta and the Personal Defense: 
The Role of a Represented Defendant in Trial Tactics, 65 CAL. L. REV. 636 (1977); Marie Higgins 
Williams, The Pro se Criminal Defendant Standby Counsel and the Judge: A Proposal for Better-Defined 
Roles, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 789 (2000).  An example of the successful use of hybrid representation is the 
International Criminal Court case against Slobodan Milosevic.  Joanne Williams, Slobodan Milosevic and 
the Guarantee of Self-Representation, 32 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 553, 600 (2007).  Williams argues that 
there is an advantage to hybrid representation in cases where the defendant is more familiar than his 
lawyers with complex facts, figures, locations, and witnesses, and ―is more likely to encourage efficiency 
and order than to promote chaos.‖  Id. at 600.  Moreover, hybrid representation serves to preserve judicial 
neutrality, rather than requiring the pro se defendant to rely on judges for assistance; thus allowing the 
victim, the prosecutor, and the witnesses to see the judge as impartial.  Id. 600–01.   
244
 See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 434 F.3d 7, 16 (1st Cir. 2006) (noting that the trial court has 
discretion to grant or deny defendant's request for hybrid representation); United States v. Norris, 780 F.2d 
1207, 1211 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that defendant's request to cross-examine government's experts but 
have appointed counsel conduct all other aspects of the case was properly denied because this decision is 
within the trial court's discretion); United States v. Mosely, 810 F.2d 93, 98 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding that 
defendant's request for hybrid representation was found to be properly denied despite the fact that the 
defendant was an attorney and a judge); United States v. Oakey, 853 F.2d 551, 553 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding 
that defendant's request to proceed pro se with standby counsel was denied because defendant sought to act 
as co-counsel); United States v. Mentzos, 462 F.3d 830, 839 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding that defendant's 




  Mississippi and North Dakota appear to be the only states where 
hybrid counsel is permitted.
246
 
¶101 Hybrid representation is not much different from the limited representation 
phenomenon (or unbundled legal services) in the civil context,
247
 which is permissible 
under legal ethics principles
248
 and rules of procedure governing limited appearances in a 
growing number of states.
249
  The benefits in civil cases include increased access to 
                                                                                                                                                 
request for hybrid representation was within trial court's discretion to deny and the denial was deemed 
proper after the defendant conducted a majority of the trial pro se).   
 Some courts hold that hybrid representation should only rarely be allowed.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Olano, 62 F.3d 1180, 1193 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that defendant's request to appear as co-
counsel was denied when the defendant failed to establish a ―special need‖ to participate); McCulloch, 364 
F. 3d at 8 (noting that hybrid counsel was only granted occasionally in court‘s discretion, but noting that 
―[s]uch largess is, however, to be dispensed sparingly‖).  But see Page v. Burger, 406 F.3d 489, 493, 495 
(8th Cir. 2005) (noting that hybrid representation was allowed when defendant permitted standby counsel 
to cross-examine witnesses, make objections, and file for mistrial); United States v. Leggett, 81 F.3d 220, 
226 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (noting that hybrid representation was allowed when defendant was permitted to 
participate directly in the trial as he pleased). 
245
 One such case is Howard v. State where the conviction was reversed when the trial court denied the pro 
se defendant‘s request to allow one of his two standby attorneys to make his closing argument.  Howard v. 
State, 697 So.2d 415, 427 (Miss. 1997). 
246
 See Goff v. State, 14 So. 3d 625, 642–43 (Miss. 2009) (noting that a trial court may permit hybrid 
representation which consists of ―the participation by an attorney in the conduct of the trial when the 
defendant is proceeding pro se‖); Metcalf v. State, 629 So.2d 558, 565 (Miss. 1993) (noting that hybrid 
counsel may participate in or assist in the preparation of such activities as opening statements, examination 
of witnesses and closing arguments); City of Fargo v. McMorrow, 367 N.W.2d 167 (N.D. 1985) (noting 
that defendant was allowed to participate in his defense along with counsel).   
247
 This model of legal services delivery has been promoted as a means of affording some legal services to 
those who otherwise would be unable to afford full legal representation and has become popular in both 
Canada and the U.S.  See, e.g., LAW SOCIETY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA, REPORT OF THE UNBUNDLING LEGAL 
SERVICES TASK FORCE; LIMITED RETAINERS: PROFESSIONALISM AND PRACTICE 3–5 (2008), available at 
http://www.lawsociety.bc.ca/publications_forms/report-committees/intro.html (follow hyperlink ―Report of 
the Unbundling of Legal Services Task Force—Limited Retainers: Professionalism and Practice‖); POLICY 
SECRETARIAT, LAW SOCIETY OF UPPER CANADA, UNBUNDLING‖ OF LEGAL SERVICES AND LIMITED LEGAL 
REPRESENTATION: BACKGROUND INFORMATION AND PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO PROFESSIONAL 
CONDUCT RULES,  available at http://www.lsuc.on.ca/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=2147483764; 
Forrest Mosten & Lee Borden, Unbundled Legal Services , http://zorza.net/resources/Ethics/mosten-
borden.htm; CAL. COMM‘ N ON ACCESS TO JUSTICE, REPORT ON LIMITED SCOPE LEGAL ASSISTANCE WITH 
INITIAL RECOMMENDATIONS (2001); MERRIE-ROXIE CROWELL, UNBUNDLED LEGAL SERVICES 
MONITORING COMMITTEE, REPORT OF THE UNBUNDLED LEGAL SERVICES MONITORING COMMITTEE (2005), 
available at  
https://www.floridabar.org/TFB/TFBResources.nsf/Attachments/B591E315F65F20FC85256FE1007766E3
/$FILE/SpecialUnbunLegalServMonitorRpt..pdf?OpenElement; MICH. BAR ASS‘N, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 
TASK FORCE REPORT (2003), available at www.michbar.org/programs/atj/pdfs/AnnualReport2002-
2003.pdf; ABA SECTION OF LITIG., HANDBOOK ON LIMITED SCOPE LEGAL ASSISTANCE: A REPORT OF THE 
MODEST MEANS TASK FORCE (2003), available at  
https://www.abanet.org/litigation/taskforces/modest/report.pdf.   
248
 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(c) (2004) (―[L]awyer may limit the scope of the 
representation if the limitation is reasonable under the circumstances and the client gives informed 
consent.‖).   
249
 For instance, the Arizona rule, which, like other emerging limited representation rules, provides for a 
simplified method of withdrawing from a case upon completion of the limited representation.  ARIZ. FAM. 
LAW PROC. 9(B) (2010); cf. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 81(e) (2007); FLA. FAM. LAW FORM 12.900(g) (2009) N.H. 
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justice, preparation for self-represented litigants of documents that are legible, complete, 
and accurate; clarifying the presentation of issues to the court; and reduction of pro se 
errors, continuances, demands on court personnel, and court congestion.
250
  Serious 
consideration should be given to permitting hybrid representation to enhance the 
competence of ―gray-area‖ defendants to control their own defense.  
D. Amicus Curiae  
¶102 Another Canadian method for assisting pro se defendants is the amicus curiae 
appointment.
251
  Unlike in the United States, where amici are generally involved at the 
appellate level, Canadian judges routinely appoint amici at the trial level, particularly in 
pro se criminal cases.  The primary role of amicus curiae is to assist the court without 
acting on behalf of the accused; the amicus‘s role will vary ―depending on the 
circumstances under which the appointment is made.‖252  Courts define the role at trial of 
amici to include: ―1) to represent unrepresented interests before the court; 2) to inform 
the court of some fact or circumstance that the court may otherwise be unaware of; or 3) 
to advise the court of a point of law.‖253  Amici have been appointed to represent 
defendants found unfit to stand trial
254
 and those removed from the courtroom due to 
disruptive conduct,
255
 in which case they act more like defense counsel.
256
  They have 
also been appointed to assist the court in determining whether a witness, accused, or other 
                                                                                                                                                 
SUPER. CT. 15(e) (2011); N.M. DIST. CT. R. CIV. P. 1-089(C) (2008); N.D. R. CIV. P. 11(e)(1) (2009); Utah 
R. Civ. P. 75(b)–(c) (2008); Vt. R. Civ. P. 79.1(h) (2009). 
250
 Liz Pejeau, Ethically Speaking: Limited Scope Representation: Making Representation Affordable . . . 
and Ethical, 48 ORANGE CNTY. LAW. 38, 41–41 (2006) (summarizing the ethical issues arising from 
unbundled legal services, and noting this model affords lawyers new practice opportunities, and increases 
pro bono legal services from attorneys who ―may be more likely to provide pro bono assistance if not 
forced to commit to a whole case, but can instead limit his or her involvement to just one aspect of a case.‖ 
See also Kathleen Bird, A Look at Unbundling of Legal Services, 63 MO. B. [J. OF THE MO. BAR] 18 (2007) 
(describing the national unbundling trend as a means of addressing the growth in self-representation, 
particularly in family courts). 
251
 Canadian courts have the power to appoint amicus at the trial of an unrepresented accused. See, e.g., R. 
v. Samra [1998], 41 O.R. 3d 431(Can. Ont. C.A.). 
252
 R. v. Cairenius, 2008 CanLII 28219 (Can. On. S.C.).  An early description of the amici role was given in 
Grice v. The Queen: ―In its ordinary use the term implies the friendly intervention of counsel to remind the 
Court of some matter of law which has escaped its notice and in regard to which it is in danger of going 
wrong.‖  Grice v. The Queen, (1957), 11 D.L.R. 2d 699, 702 (Can. Ont. H.C.J.). 
253
 Khadr v. Canada, (Attorney General) [2008] F.C. 46 (Can.).  Courts sometimes permit amici to conduct 
a cross-examination for an accused.  R. v. Phung, 2006 CanLII 57079 (Can. On. S.C.). 
254
 See R. v. Phung, 2006 CanLII 57079 (Can. On. S.C.). 
255
 R. v. Atherley 2009 ONCA 195 (Can. On. C.A.); R. v. Lee [1998] N.W.T.J. No. 194 (Can. N.W.T. 
S.C.). 
256
 Cf. R. v. Brown 1999 CarswellOnt 4700, (Can. On. C.J.) (WL) (noting that amici did not cross-examine 
witnesses or give legal advice to the accused).  As noted in R. v. Cairenius:   
 [A]mici do not take instruction from the accused/applicant, and do not have a solicitor-client 
relationship with the accused/applicant. They are not restricted to making submissions on behalf 
of the accused/applicant. Indeed, the role of amicus in general does not include making 
submissions on behalf of the accused/applicant. No doubt there will be cases . . . where the patient 
refuses to participate in the proceedings, and amicus may be appointed to present argument as 
though they were counsel for the patient. However, that is not the general role of amicus. 
R. v. Cairenius, 2008 CanLII 28219, para 61 (Can. On. S.C.) (emphasis omitted).  
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third party is subject to informer privilege.
257
  Similarly courts have appointed amici to 
help criminal defendants with their appeals.
258
 
¶103 American courts should adopt the Canadian approach of appointing amici to assist 
the court in the circumstances described.  A liaison between the court and a ―gray-area‖ 
pro se defendant will assist the court in communicating the defendant‘s position and 
needs to the court and the prosecution, and performing other functions short of 
representation that enhance the defendant‘s competence to present his or her defense. 
E. Non-Lawyer Agent 
¶104 While a foreign concept in today‘s American courts, non-lawyer practice exists 
today under Canadian law.  Non-lawyer ―agents‖ may be given a ―right of audience,‖ in 
other words, the right to represent another, in a variety of matters.  These include small 
claims cases,
259




 and minor criminal cases.
262
  Courts 
must assure themselves that the agent selected by an otherwise unrepresented party is 
                                                 
257
 Named Person v. Vancouver Sun, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 253 (Can. S.C.C.). 
258
 Attorney General of Ontario v. McNeil, 2007 CanLII 25191 (Can. C.C.C.).  There are also instances in 
which motions for appointment of amicus curiae counsel are denied, such as where a defendant sought the 
appointment of an amicus to assist him in securing the services of an expert witness.  See, e.g., R. v. Beitel, 
2008 CanLII 63180 (Can. On. S.C.) (denying motion where there is no evidence that the defendant is 
unable to find an expert himself); H.M.Q. v. Waranuk, 2008 YKSC 49 (Can. Y.S.C.) (finding no error in 
trial judge‘s refusal to appoint amici for defendant found fit to stand trial in light of judicial assistance 
provided, but judgment reversed because of court‘s failure to appoint counsel where reasonable grounds 
existed defendant was unfit).  
259
 Ontario Courts of Justice Act provides: 
  A party may be represented in a proceeding in the Small Claims Court by a person 
authorized under the Law Society Act to represent the party, but the court may exclude 
from a hearing anyone, other than a person licensed under the Law Society Act, appearing 
on behalf of the party if it finds that such person is not competent properly to represent 
the party, or does not understand and comply at the hearing with the duties and 
responsibilities of an advocate. 
R.S.O. 1990, c. C.-43, 26 (Can.). 
260
 In the Family Court, the Agent must apply in writing for permission with sufficient materials to allow 
the Court to exercise its discretion. The Agent must indicate: 
(1) the extent of the representation requested . . . (2) qualifications of the paralegal, 
including education and experience; (3) how those qualifications relate to the nature of 
the representation requested; (4) [an] indication of whether the paralegal is subject to the 
direction or supervision of anyone or any organization; (5) evidence of good character; 
(6) what insurance or compensation fund would be available in the event of the 
paralegal's negligence or fraud; and (7) indication of whether the paralegal is 
knowledgeable about and prepared to abide by any relevant code of conduct [and the 
Rules]. 
Equiprop Management Ltd. v. Harris reflex [2000], 51 O.R. 3d 496 (Div. Ct.). 
261
 But see Law Soc. of B.C. v. Lawrie, 1987 CanLII 2443 (BC S.C.). 
262
 The Canadian Criminal Code provides: ―A defendant may appear personally or by counsel or agent, but 
the summary conviction court may require the defendant to appear personally . . . .‖  R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, 
800(2).  However, § 802.1 prohibits an appearance, examination, or cross-examination of witnesses by an 
agent ―if he or she is liable, on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term of more than six months, 
unless the defendant is a corporation or the agent is authorized to do so under a program approved by the 
lieutenant governor in council of the province.‖  R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, 802.1.  The provision of the 
Canadian Criminal Code permitting non-lawyer agents in minor criminal cases does not, however, permit 
their appearance for a fee in the juvenile court.  R. v. D.S. (2005), A.B.P.C. 114 (Can. Alta.). 





  Canadian courts also have inherent power to use non-lawyer representatives, 
but courts have held that this power should be used only ―rarely and with caution,‖264 and 
may not be invoked when in conflict with a statute, such as that which regulates the 
unauthorized practice of law.
265
 
¶105 These provisions are not without controversy, as they operate within an extensive 
scheme of Canadian provincial laws that, as in the United States, prohibit the 
unauthorized practice of law.
266
  But there are many persons who could perform the 
functions of a non-lawyer agent for ―gray-area‖ defendants and assist them in presenting 
their chosen defense in many cases.  These could include former police officers, college 
professors, counselors, paralegals, or anyone else with prior experience in the justice 
system.  Use of such agents would be cost effective and, like the other alternatives 
presented, would enhance the ―gray-area‖ defendant‘s competence to present his or her 
defense. 
F. McKenzie Friend 
¶106 In the English case of McKenzie v. McKenzie,267 an appeal in a divorce action, the 
appellate court addressed the trial court‘s refusal to allow an Australian attorney who was 
not licensed in Great Britain to assist the husband in court.  The court held that the trial 
judge should have allowed the attorney to assist the husband because the husband had 
problems communicating and the case was quite complex.
268
   
¶107 The headnote to McKenzie asserted that pro se defendants had a right to a non-
lawyer ―friend‖ to assist them in court.  That assumption was dashed in R. v. Leicester 
                                                 
263
 Courts have the responsibility to ensure that persons appearing before them are properly represented and 
defended so as to maintain the rule of law and the integrity of the court generally.  There are times when 
the court must scrutinize the selection or representation provided by a nonlawyer agent:   
 It is impossible to catalogue all of the circumstances in which representation by a particular agent 
would imperil the administration of justice and properly call for an order disqualifying that agent. 
Obviously, representation by agents lacking the ability to competently represent an accused 
endangers all aspects of the proper administration of justice, particularly the accused's right to a 
fair trial.  
R. v. Romanowicz, 1999 CanLII 1315, para. 74 (Can. ON C.A.). 
264
 Venrose Holdings Ltd. v. Pacific Press Ltd. 1978 CanLII 378 (Can. B.C.C.A.).  
265
 See Law Society et al. v. Nixon (1992), 102 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 310, para. 41 (noting that the judge‘s 
inherent powers to regulate the procedure of his or her court applies only if they do not conflict with 
relevant statutes or the rules of court);  See also Baxter Student Housing Ltd. v. College Housing Co-
operative Ltd., [1976] 2 S.C.R. 475, 480 (Can.).  
266
 The Federation of Law Societies of Canada has created a website that gives quick access to all the 
provincial practice-of-law statutes.  The Practice of Law in Canada, FEDERATION OF LAW SOCIETIES OF 
CANADA, http://www.flsc.ca/en/lawSocieties/lawSocieties.asp#discipline. 
267
 McKenzie v. McKenzie [1970] 3 W.L.R. 472 (Eng.). 
268
 The court cited in the English case of Collier v. Hicks, where an attorney in a criminal case began to act 
in defense of the accused without first having filed an appearance in the case.  [1831] 2 B. & Ad. 663.  The 
court removed him from the courtroom.  He then brought an action against the judge.   Id. at 672.  On 
appeal, the court held that the attorney had no right to appear and defend the accused unless he properly 
filed his appearance:  ―Any person, whether he be a professional man; or not, may attend as a friend of 
either party, may take notes, may quietly make suggestions, and give advice, but no one can demand to take 
part in the proceedings as an advocate, contrary to the regulations of the court as settled by the discretion of 
the justices.‖  Id. at 669.   
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City Justices, et al.,
269
 in which the court held that the language from Collier quoted in 
the McKenzie headnote was dicta, and that having a ―McKenzie friend‖ to help a self-
represented defendant is not a right, but rather is permissible at the discretion of the court.  
While the court declined to set forth guidelines for future cases, it held that ―justices must 
when considering an application that a friend assists an unrepresented defendant strive to 
ensure by their decision that no injustice will be done if they refuse the application and 
that the proceedings bear the appearance of fairness.‖270 
¶108 English courts routinely grant self-represented litigants assistance from a variety of 
―friends,‖ including spouses,271 siblings,272 solicitors,273 and accountants.274  English 
courts see the assistance to a pro se party as necessary to conduct fair proceedings.
275
  
Permitting non-lawyers to assist the pro se defendant is a more reasonable means of 
balancing and protecting the defendant‘s right to real autonomy, while ensuring a fair 
trial. 
¶109 Canadian courts also permit self-represented litigants the assistance of a ―McKenzie 
friend.‖276  In Canada, as in England, the ―McKenzie friend‖ may not represent the pro se 
party, but may sit at the counsel table, make suggestions quietly, refer the pro se party to 
documents, take notes, suggest questions for examination or cross-examination, and so 
forth.
277
  This practice, now commonplace in British courts and a growing trend in 
Canadian courts, has also been adopted in other Commonwealth countries.
278
  It has great 
promise as a means of providing assistance to pro se parties that the court declines to 
provide, and which may be essential for the conduct of a fair trial in cases where the 
issues are complex, or where pro se parties do not have the capacity for any number of 
reasons to present their own claim or defense.   
¶110 The U.S. Supreme Court‘s admonition that, ―in the long run, experience teaches 
that strict adherence to the procedural requirements specified by the legislature is the best 
guarantee of evenhanded administration of the law,‖279 rings hollow because it falsely 
presumes an equality of arms in an adversarial competition.  Courts sometimes provide 
                                                 
269
 [1991] W.L.R. 974 (Eng.).  
270
 Id. at 986. 
271
 KD v. Chief Constable of Hampshire, [2005] EWHC 2550 (QB) (Eng.). 
272
 S.K. Thakrar & Co. & Ors. v. Suburban Properties Ltd., [2005] EWHC 2667 (TCC) (Eng.). 
273
 Queen v. Secretary of State For Home Department ex parte Fakunle Sunday [1997] EWCA (Civ) 1940 
(Eng.). 
274
 Williams v. Fairbairn, et al, [2006] EWHC 1723 (Ch) (Eng.). 
275
 Queen v. Bow County Court [1999] QBCOF 0478/4 (Eng.). 
276
 See Milne v. Milne, [2009] ABQB 361 (Can. A.Q.B.) (permitting friend to assist); Schmidt-Paborn v. 
Lucas, 2005 CarswellAlta 930 (Can. A.B.Q.B.) (WL) (permitting father to assist); Moss v. NN Life 
Insurance Co., 2004 MBCA 10 (Can. Man. C.A.) (holding that husband is not allowed to represent his 
wife, but adding that ―In my opinion, lending a helping hand to a self-represented litigant, without fee and 
on an isolated occasion, does not constitute a violation of s. 20(2)(b) by ‗appear[ing] as a lawyer‘ before a 
court‖). 
277
 Law Society of Manitoba v. Pollock, 2007 MBQB 51 (Can. Man. Q.B.)  The friend could not hold 
himself out ―a McKenzie Friend to all and sundry, or proposed to charge a fee for his services‖  because 
―then . . . different considerations would apply.‖  Id.  So long as serving as a McKenzie Friend was only 
―an occasional basis‖ and the friend sought court permission, his services as a friend ―may not constitute 
the unauthorized practice of law.‖Id. 
278
 See, e.g., Mihaka v Police, [1981] 1 NZLR 54 (HC); Giniotis v. Farrugia, 1985 NSW LEXIS 5704 
(Whales). 
279
 Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 826 (1980). 
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leeway for pro se parties in some procedural contexts, and judges may now provide 
―reasonable accommodations‖ without threat of sanction for lack of impartiality.  But, 
until the Supreme Court overrules its earlier decisions declaring that self-represented 
defendants are not entitled to instruction or assistance from the court, no court will be 
constitutionally obligated to provide such assistance.
280
  Developments in state law or 
judicial ethics rules may be the only available means for courts to give meaning to the 
right to self-representation, to enhance access to justice for self-represented litigants, and 
to thereby gain the public‘s trust and confidence in the legitimacy of the justice system. 
¶111 The same level of assistance is not required for every pro se defendant.  The extent 
of assistance necessary for any given ―gray-area‖ pro se defendant lies on a spectrum, or 
sliding scale, and depends upon the characteristics of the defendant, the complexity of the 
case, and the substantive, procedural, and technical barriers to his making his defense of 
choice.  Thus, the court should have multiple options available like those described above 
to ensure the appropriate form and degree of assistance.  The availability of these options 
will be a matter for changes in or adoption of new court rules and perhaps legislation.   
VI. CONCLUSION 
¶112 The recognition of a right to self-representation without the creation of the 
conditions necessary for the fulfillment of this right is contradictory.  In the case of 
―gray-area‖ defendants, the Supreme Court has made autonomy a legal fiction.  Indiana 
v. Edwards demonstrates that injustice may result when the court, to avoid a ―spectacle‖ 
and the appearance of unfairness, imposes unwanted counsel on a defendant. Autonomy, 
as expressed through self-representation in the justice system, is a precious and 
fundamental right that is denied when the courts fail to provide any form of assistance 
short of imposed counsel.  
¶113 It is axiomatic that courts need the trust and confidence of the public to operate 
effectively,
281
 especially in democratic societies, like ours, that are founded on individual 
freedom and autonomy.  But to argue that ―gray-area‖ pro se defendants‘ unassisted 
defense would result in a ―spectacle,‖ giving rise to a perception of unfairness, as the 
court did in Indiana v. Edwards, assumes that judges‘, lawyers‘, and the public‘s 
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perceptions are the same.  It erroneously assumes that a reasonable observer would see 
unfairness in the pro se spectacle itself, rather than seeing the unfairness of a court which 
condones a process in which no assistance is provided to such defendants who are 
mentally challenged.  Moreover, to argue that avoidance of the spectacle by imposition of 
unwanted counsel will protect the legitimacy of the court is to improperly use such 
defendants as a means to an end.  Imposing unwanted counsel should simply be a last 
resort and not a matter of course.   
¶114 The Supreme Court created the exclusionary rule as a prophylactic remedy for 
Fourth Amendment violations to deter police misconduct, protect the integrity of the 
court, and give meaning to the Fourth Amendment.
282
 It also established special rules and 
principles governing access to justice for prisoners in order to maintain a fair and 
accessible justice system.
283
  So, too, should the Court recognize the reasonableness and 
necessity of establishing a judicial duty of reasonable assistance to ―gray-area‖ pro se 
defendants, and permit the use of innovative forms of assistance and representation in 
lieu of unwanted counsel.  These approaches will prevent the feared ―spectacle‖ the 
Supreme Court in Edwards sought to avoid, and will increase the perception of fairness 
and satisfaction with the justice system among defendants, jurors, public trial observers, 
and those permitted to render assistance.  More importantly, it will fulfill the promise of 
freedom and equal justice by giving meaning to the fundamental rights of dignity, 
autonomy, and personhood before the law. 
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